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MOLTKE'S PROJECTS

FOR THE

CAMPAIGN OF 1866 AGAINST AUSTRIA.

(WITH MAP.)

TRANSLATED AND PRÉCISED

FOR THE

GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE,

FROM

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UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

[N.B.—*In this paper Prussian Army Corps are denoted by Roman numerals; thus, VIII means the eighth Prussian Army Corps.*]

MOLTKE'S PROJECTS FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866 AGAINST AUSTRIA.*

A NEW light was thrown upon the campaign of 1864 by the publication, in 1892, of Moltke's military correspondence during that war—a volume which revealed, as nothing published before it had done, the brilliant abilities and resolute character of the Prussian general. That delightful volume was followed, in 1896, by the publication of a selection from Moltke's military papers relating to the war of 1866. These papers, to some extent, lift the thin veil which in the Staff history half concealed the moving springs. They are divided into four parts, collected under the headings of preparation, mobilization, and deployment, the actual operations, the truce and peace. The chief interest of these disclosures lies in the first part, for it is the arrangements for the first deployment and subsequent concentration of the Prussian Army that have formed the principal subject of controversy in regard to this campaign. Moreover, since the construction of railways, the great importance which always in every campaign has attached to the opening has been, if anything, increased. The opening is usually arranged with a deliberation impossible in the subsequent stages of the action. It is the part of the game which admits of the completest study beforehand, and it is the part in which for this campaign abundant evidence is now given. Moltke's colleagues of the Staff have told us since his death that they were much impressed by his habitual effort to think things out, and that he used in this process to assist himself by putting his thoughts on paper and re-writing his analysis or his argument again and again until he found it satisfactory. In the first part of the

* "Moltke's Militärische Korrespondenz. Aus den Dienstschriften des Krieges, 1866. Herausgegeben vom Grossen Generalstabe. Abtheilung für Kriegsgeschichte." Mit 1 Uebersichtskarte, 3 Plänen und 1 Text-skizze. Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1896.

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collection before us there are, besides a number of official letters, more than 20 of the memoranda in which Moltke cleared his mind with regard to the arrangements for the war against Austria. They enable us to trace through almost all its phases the growth of his plan of campaign.

[As early as the spring of 1860 Moltke wrote a memoir upon the deployment of the Prussian Army in case of war against Austria. It is, of course, based upon an examination of the then existing political situation, and of the condition of the Austrian and Prussian Armies at that date, when King William I was still Prince Regent, and while the Army reorganization, of which he was the author, was in process. This paper is here translated in full.]

Memoir No. 1. (*Translation.*)

Deployment of the Prussian Army in a Possible War against Austria.

"A war between Austria and Prussia would affect all the Powers of Europe; for a considerable success of the one or the other would end the present disintegrated condition of Germany, subject the small States to the victor, and found in the centre of Europe a united State, which would be equal or superior in power and influence to any of its neighbours.

"Among the great Powers, England necessarily requires a strong ally upon the Continent. It would find none which would better correspond to all its interests than a united Germany, which can never claim the command of the sea, but which by a strong central position between the Romance West and the Slavonic East secures for all time the greatest imaginable stability upon the Continent. A far-seeing policy of the Cabinet of St. James would necessarily support such a transformation, and out of consideration for the ties of kindred and of religion use its influence in behalf of Prussia. Yet it is probable that England, clinging to the old order, would take the side of the party attacked in order to prevent a political remodelling of Europe, of which it must be admitted that the far-reaching consequences cannot in all their bearings be foreseen.

"For direct interference in the contest, England could use only her fleet, and a weak army to be landed on the Continent. Her hostility would destroy our trade and devastate our ports, but both these forms of damage together would not suffice to endanger the existence of the State.

The friendship of England, on the other hand, would protect our coasts, and might furnish the kernel for the formation of a Belgian auxiliary army. But even this limited effort of assistance becomes doubtful the moment that the interests of France are on the opposite side, because then Britain requires all her forces to protect herself.

"And this case arises immediately if war breaks out between Austria and Prussia.

"France least of all can wish, as the outcome of this conflict, for an Empire of the German nation, comprising 70,000,000 inhabitants, but from the conflict itself may hope for the very greatest advantages—the acquisition of Belgium, of the Rhenish Province, and perhaps of Holland; indeed, these advantages may be looked for almost with certainty if Prussia's principal forces are held fast upon the Elbe and Oder. Moreover, inasmuch as Prussia only, and not Austria, defends those Rhinelands, an alliance with Prussia could have no direct object for France. It would better correspond to the Austrian interest to sacrifice territory in the German West if thereby in the East the Austrian dynastic power can be fixed upon lasting foundations.

"These same reasons would, without doubt, suffice to induce Russia to take Prussia's side. However much Russia may desire extension along the southern coast of the Baltic, her main interests are towards the East. The uninterrupted internal decay of the Ottoman Empire offers there, between the fairest seas, the richest lands, whose inhabitants of kindred race and faith have been awaiting for centuries the entry of the blonde nation into Byzantium, to raise once more the Grecian cross upon the dome of St. Sophia. The realization of the plans formed even in her day by the great Empress Catherine could be prevented in the long run by none of the Maritime Powers, but only by Austria. Accordingly, nothing is so contrary to the interests of Russia as a considerable extension of the Austrian power.

"But for Prussia the help of Russia has always the twofold disadvantage that it comes too late, and is too powerful. Moscow, which we may regard as the centre of gravity of Russia, is as far distant from Berlin as Madrid or Naples. The Russian Army is spread over a surface of 1,000,000 square miles. It concentrates slowly and has from the Volga to the Vistula 1,400 miles of country without a railway to pass through. The might of the Russian Army will arrive at our frontier when we shall either have conquered, and therefore no longer require help,

or shall have been defeated, and must pay dear for it with provinces. For Russia, if she comes in at the end of the campaign with a fresh army of 300,000 men is mistress of the situation, and has the chief share in deciding the limits up to which we may make the most of our success, or must submit to our misfortune.

"Great importance, in a war between Austria and Prussia, attaches to the behaviour of the minor States, for their help is in part quicker than that of Russia, and more momentous than that of England.

"For Belgium it would be of much value if a British auxiliary corps, even a weak one, landed at Antwerp, should furnish the nucleus for the collection of her own forces. Belgium must say to herself that France if it intends to conquer the bank of the Rhine, cannot respect Belgian neutrality, and that the possession of the Rhenish Province without the possession of Belgium is inconceivable. The assembly of the Belgian forces at Antwerp leaves open to the enemy the country and the capital, of which the reconquest is possible only by Prussian forces, and in the same way the Netherlands can seek help only from Prussia.

"In Italy things are as yet only developing, but even now it is clear that in all circumstances we shall have in Sardinia an ally against France as against Austria, and most certainly against both if they act in concert. Our interest seems to demand the utmost strengthening of this newly-reviving Power. Denmark, too, if the question of Schleswig-Holstein were settled, would be the natural ally of Prussia. Until then it must be regarded as an enemy, but will probably remain neutral on account of internal dissensions. Switzerland and Sweden will take no action.

"The situation of the small German States is peculiar. Their whole existence is based upon the jealousy between Austria and Prussia. So soon as this tension is relaxed, either by union or by war, they see in either case their existence threatened. Neutrality is not possible, at least not to them all; it leads to the immediate occupation of their territories. If the power which they join is victorious, it gains such a preponderance that even though their existence may have been guaranteed as the price of their co-operation, they must in the long run disappear in a rearrangement corresponding to actual power. If their ally is defeated, they fall with him a prey to the enemy.

"The German States have thus just as much to fear a complete union as a serious breach between Austria and Prussia. If the latter should occur they must take sides,

and their choice will be determined, above all things, by their geographical position.

"To no human intelligence can it be given to trace in advance the course of such great political events, upon which not only the permanent interest of States, but also the sympathies and antipathies of rulers, the insight and energy of Cabinets at the critical moment, and internal disturbances or popular risings often exercise an effective, though incalculable, impulsion. Yet the following points may be assumed with some degree of certainty:—

"A war between Austria and Prussia will draw all Europe into the conflict.

"France is to be regarded as Prussia's enemy, and will aim at the conquest of all the Rhinelands, which Austria will not oppose.

"Russia, and probably England too, will be on Prussia's side, but the direct help of the one does not become available until late, that of the other will have no decisive influence.

"In Belgiam and Holland, as in Italy, there will be help for Prussia.

"The North German States cannot, without immediately renouncing their existence, evade co-operation with Prussia; Saxony alone—at least its Government—can and will, certainly stand with Austria.

"The South German Courts, on the other hand, will probably form a neutral league, not despising the protectorate of France; for in a war between the members of the German confederacy, the fundamental laws of the confederacy can have no validity.

"If it comes to a breach between Austria and Prussia, there may arise from the conflict, according to its issue, a powerful Empire under the rule of Habsburg or of Hohenzollern; but Germany will have to pay for this eventual unity by the loss of provinces in the east and west.

"The result, which we require to enable us to form a judgment of the initial military situation, can be reached only along the slippery but inevitable path of political speculation. It is enough, however, to see:—

"1. That Austria, in a war against Prussia, cannot completely denude the defences of her Eastern frontiers.

"For although it is true that the weight of Russia's forces does not begin to tell until a late stage, yet Russia has at all times forces enough at hand in the kingdom of Poland, in Volhynia, Podolia, and Bessarabia to create most

serious embarrassments for the Austrian Empire by taking advantage of the disaffection which prevails among the Hungarian and Slavonian populations.

"2. Another part of the Austrian Army will be fully occupied in Italy.

"For although, during the conflict against Prussia, Austria cannot think of the reconquest of Lombardy, she will still have to defend Venetia against Piedmont.

"3. But Prussia in her turn will not be able to bring up her two army corps from the Rhine to protect the Marks and Silesia.

"These corps will operate upon the Rhine in connection with Belgian, Dutch, and probably English auxiliaries.

"4. The contingents of the 10th Federal Corps can be counted upon only to observe Denmark, or, if the case should arise, to form a support on the Rhine; for the advance of the French there endangers Hanover and even Oldenburg.

"On the other hand, Prussia can freely dispose of all the seven army corps of her Eastern provinces.

"If one or another of the remaining German States should join Prussia, that will be a help which has not been counted upon in advance.

"Austria at present employs for the occupation of Venetia the 5th, 7th, and 8th Corps, all of them even now fully mobilized = 125,000; the 3rd Corps, also mobilized, and 40,000 men strong, stands ready at Laibach.

"In a war against Prussia, Austria would confine herself in Italy to mere defence; for that purpose she does not require so important a force. But even on the strictest defensive two army corps, the 5th and 8th—95,000 men—would hardly suffice in that quarter, seeing that the fortresses require 60,000 men for garrisons, and that, consequently, only 35,000 men would remain to take the field.

"Russia can assemble on the eastern frontier of Austria about 120,000 men in four weeks. The 6th Corps at Pesth when mobilized attains a strength of ... ... 50,000 men.
The corps in Transylvania ... ... 12,000 „
With the probable addition from the cavalry in Hungary of 60 squadrons ... ... 10,000 „

Altogether ... ... 72,000 „

If, then, the Sardinians and the Russians were at all active, these forces would be sufficient neither at the foot of the Alps nor of the Carpathians. It may, however, be assumed

that the 7th Corps of 40,000 men now standing at Treviso near the railway is kept ready as a reinforcement for Venetia or Hungary, according as the greater danger threatens upon the one side or upon the other.

"Not available are also 40,000 men in Dalmatia, Croatia, the Banate, and in the fortresses of the German Confederation. Accordingly there remain for war against Prussia the—

	Men.
1st Corps in Prague, strength when mobilized	35,000
2nd „ Vienna „ „	52,000
3rd „ Laibach (is mobilized)	40,000
4th „ Brünn, strength when mobilized	35,000
Forty-three battalions of frontier troops ...	60,000
Cavalry corps of 60 squadrons from Hungary	10,000
Army reserve of artillery	3,000
Together	235,000
Subtract for garrisons of the fortresses Prague, Olmütz, Theresienstadt, and Josephstadt ...	40,000
Leaves	195,000
The Saxon Army at Dresden	25,000
Altogether	220,000

"It is impossible to give the exact time when these forces can be assembled in Northern Bohemia. The great difficulty in all Austrian mobilizations consists in completing the supply of horses. Even now, when half the army is mobilized, the other half still requires about 40,000 horses, which it is intended to procure by purchase in the open market. The experience of all former campaigns shows that for this operation several months are requisite. So much, then, may be concluded with certainty, that the principal mass of the army, even with incomplete teams for the artillery and trains, cannot in less than four weeks stand upon the line Prague–Pardubitz–Olmütz, and that the whole army cannot be assembled on the upper Elbe ready for operations in less than six weeks, while probably a much longer time will be required.

"The Saxon Corps can, it is said, stand concentrated at Dresden–Pirna in 14 days, but it is too weak to be able to undertake anything alone.

"If we presuppose that at the time of the war against Prussia the 3rd Austrian Corps is already mobilized, this

corps and the 1st would, at the expiration of four weeks, be able to advance from Prague, take up the Saxon Corps, and with altogether 100,000 men be able to attempt the offensive or to cover the concentration of the remaining corps on the mountainous northern frontier.

"Very great mistakes, therefore, would be necessary on our part to render practicable a disturbance of our own concentration.

"This should be effected at the following points :—

IV Army Corps at Delitzsch and Halle.
III „ „ Torgau and Herzberg.
II „ „ Wittenberg.
I „ „ Jüterbog.
Guard Corps „ Baruth.
V Army Corps at Spremberg.
VI „ „ Striegau and Schweidnitz.

"From the points named there can be concentrated between Torgau and Herzberg in two marches 165,000 men; if in consequence of delayed mobilization we should be really confined to the defensive, at Dresden in five marches 198,000 men. ...

"In this latter advance the IV, III, and II Army Corps might move forward on the left bank of the Elbe, the I Guard and V Corps on its right bank, seeing that we should be stronger upon either side than all that the enemy could possibly assemble at Dresden, if we have mobilized in good time.

"The Saxon Army if it held its ground should be immediately attacked, Dresden temporarily fortified and prepared as a place for magazines and for a depôt of supplies both for the defensive and for a further offensive.

"Whether and how the offensive on the right bank of the Elbe with the co-operation of the V Army Corps through Trautenau should be continued into Bohemia can only be decided when the time comes according to the military situation. It is probable that the Austrian concentration in Bohemia will be effected much less rapidly than is assumed above. In that case there will be favourable opportunities which naturally depend upon our taking the initiative in time.

"The advance of our army upon Prague, or even one of the fortresses of the mountain passes on the northern border of Bohemia, renders impossible any principal operation of the Austrians into Silesia. It either reduces them to the

defensive on the upper Elbe, or compels them to attempt the offensive in the conditions so favourable to us presented by the line of the river from Dresden to Wittenberg.

"The following observations seem called for:—

"If Prussia intended an *aggressive* war against Austria she would assemble her Army in Silesia, of which the frontier is distant only 140 miles from Vienna. Berlin would be sufficiently protected by an Army corps at Torgau, and in less than six weeks 200,000 men would stand facing the Sudetes ready for invasion.

"Possibly Austria might be completely surprised, but it would be well to consider whether, in opposition to the power of the Empire, which increases for resistance with time, Prussia would be able to maintain her initial success, for it must be remembered that the strategical offensive, differing in this from the tactical offensive, undoubtedly presupposes a far greater development of force than the strategical defensive.

"Moreover, in that case very different political conditions would present themselves than those which were assumed above; neither Russia nor any other Power, except perhaps Sardinia, would support aggressive action on the part of Prussia.

"An aggressive war, however, lies altogether outside the bounds of a study which contemplates, in the first instance, only territorial defence in the narrower sense. We have here to consider only the case of Prussia being attacked by Austria, which, however, in no way excludes that kind of offensive that may develop from the measures adopted in the first instance for defence.

"If the purpose of Austria in the war is the overthrow of the Prussian monarchy, she will operate with her principal army directly towards Berlin, which is only 94 miles from the southern frontier.

"The occupation of our capital by the enemy cannot indeed decide the campaign, but the material and moral disadvantages involved in the loss of Berlin do not require to be pointed out.

"A rapid advance of the Austrians to this important point of junction of all our railways and principal communications will interfere with the assembly of our corps approaching from the east and the west. Berlin itself is not fortified. An army told off to defend it against an attack from the south is confined to a narrow strip of

ground in its front; if it is thrown back beyond Berlin a few marches bring it to the sea. Our whole theatre of war has a depth of only 187 miles. No third fortress closes the space, 140 miles wide, between Torgau and Glogau, none of the great rivers which offer protection against the east and the west bars the advance of the enemy in this direction.

"If Austria aimed at an object of less magnitude it would probably be the reconquest of Silesia.

"The capital of this province, too, is not fortified, and can be reached in a few marches from the district where the Elbe rises. Schweidnitz in its present condition cannot be defended, Glatz can be rendered harmless by the occupation of the mountain passes, Neisse and Cosel are 56 and 84 miles away from the enemy's line of advance.

"But it would be more difficult for the enemy to keep his position in Silesia. By his march upon Breslau we gain time to collect all our forces on the middle Oder, and if the possession of that city cannot be rendered secure without the defeat of our Army in the field, Austria will do better at once to seek that army in the direction of Berlin and to conquer Silesia in Brandenburg.

"This is the shortest way to the most complete and rapid decision, and it is conceivable that the Austrians should set all their forces in motion towards this one goal, neglecting Silesia for the time. But we shall see that a rightly-conducted defence will, after all, compel the enemy, as he continues his advance towards Berlin, to extend his base so as to include Silesia. And, as it is always important at the final conclusion of peace to be in actual possession of the land which you intend to keep, and as a serious menace to the capital is extraordinarily facilitated by the occupation of Silesia, and the possession of its rich resourses, it follows that the most advantageous, and, therefore, most probable, plan is for Austria to direct the principal operation against the Marks, and at the same time a minor operation against Silesia.

"From Bohemia, Austria threatens alike Silesia and the Marks. A concentration of the Austrian Army behind the Giant Mountains and the mountains of Lusatia, keeps us until the last moment in uncertainty of the enemy's intentions. The direction of the railways and the fertility of the country favour the advance and the supply of large masses of troops. Mountain ranges cover the concentration, Theresienstadt, Prague, and Josephstadt protect the railway lines and magazines, which can be filled from the

richest cornfields of the Empire. Lastly, an army assembled in Northern Bohemia guarantees for the policy of Saxony the necessary backing, and for her army a near support or protection in case of retreat.

"It can, therefore, scarcely be doubtful that the first assembly of the Austrian Army destined to act against Prussia will take place upon and in front of the line Prague-Pardubitz.

"If the Austrians, with their main force, should advance on the left bank of the Elbe, they would come upon our line of fortresses, Torgau-Wittenberg-Magdeburg, and we, acting from a central point, should render very difficult for them their subsequent passage of the river. They will, therefore, to facilitate their first deployment, make use of the left bank only so far as they are masters of the Elbe, that is, in favourable circumstances only as far as Dresden. Their chief line of march lies on the right bank, and leads through the Lusatian Mountains. The army advancing by this route against the Marks remains also in the closest possible connection with an auxiliary army advancing through Trautenau against Breslau. Upon the front, only 56 miles long, between Teplitz and Reichenberg, both of which end points are reached by the railway, there are seven good roads for the passage across the mountains: Teplitz-Dresden, Aussig-Pirna, Tetschen-Schandau, Kamnitz-Schluckenau, Haida-Rumburg, Gabel-Löbau, Reichenberg-Görlitz.

"Thus, only three days after the declaration of war, there may be of these columns: Three at Dresden, three at Bischofswerda, one at Görlitz, or one at Dresden, five at Bautzen, one at Görlitz, according as the position of the Prussian forces makes it desirable to act with stronger forces upon the Elbe, or upon the upper Spree. One additional march suffices to unite almost the whole force between the two rivers named if the approach of a decision should render this necessary. Further towards Berlin lead, it is true, only two metalled high roads, that from Dresden by Herzberg, and that from Bautzen by Cottbus, which at the named points are 47 miles apart, and only then begin to converge again. But the country is, in general, passable, and between the two high roads there are roads suitable for vehicles from Radeburg to Schlieben, from Königsbrück to Dahme, and from Kamenz to Luckau. At the River Dahme all these roads pass between the Black Elster and the Spree-Wald, which are only 21 miles apart. It would be practical to push forward an advance guard along the central one

of these roads so far in front and in such strength that it could, even though giving ground, resist a hostile attack from the north for 24 hours, in order to gain time for the other columns to concentrate at Dahme, Finsterwalde, or Ruhland. If the enemy's attack came from the west, the left wing column, marching along the Herzburg high road, would have to cover the other columns, and to fall back upon them if necessary. No doubt in that case this road would be lost; in any case, it passes too near to the fortresses on the Elbe for the invading army to be able to count very much upon it. But on account of the distance of the Cottbus high road the concentration of all the forces for a decisive battle cannot be effected in one day; if the opponent presses forward vigorously, the second and the third roads will be lost, and the Cottbus road itself threatened. It thus becomes clear how important for the Austrian attack is the possibility of a retreat upon Silesia. No doubt this implies that the subordinate army from Trautenau has at the same time reached at least Liegnitz, has driven the defender back upon Breslau, or, in case he uncovers Breslau and retires upon Glogau, keeps him sufficiently occupied and secures for the principal army the line of communication through Bautzen and Görlitz.

"If in the preceding paragraphs the operations most advantageous for the Austrians, which therefore they will most probably select, has been correctly ascertained, the main outlines of the most effective defence may be deduced from it.

"Our political frontier towards the south stretches from Berun to Erfurt, about 470 miles. The better front of defence passes behind the Giant Mountains and the Erzgebirge, and has almost the same extent. The enemy from Prague can reach Schweidnitz and Torgau in about the same time. Roads and railways assist the advance in both directions. If it were possible to defend a line of this extent from a single point, Görlitz would be the place of assembly for our forces, based upon the largest part of the monarchy and connected by railways with Breslau, Posen, and Berlin. But we have already seen that the districts threatened have a very different value for us, and that we may expose Silesia to a temporary invasion, while the occupation of Berlin would involve very serious disadvantages. However favourable the prospect of success, we could not march into Silesia against the minor army advancing through Trautenau without leaving the Marks entirely open to the enemy's principal army, and, seeing

that neither the concentration of the Austrian Army in Northern Bohemia, the establishment of magazines there, nor even the partial crossing of the frontier, will give us any definite indication of the direction in which the enemy is aiming his principal blow, we are compelled so to arrange our first concentration that it can immediately oppose the more dangerous of the two operations of the enemy by a defensive which will not exclude a subsequent offensive.

"The first concentration of our principal force must, therefore, be placed further west than Görlitz and nearer to the Elbe, and Silesia must be protected by a separate portion of the army.

"We have now at once to decide whether we choose the direct or an indirect defence of the capital. If we choose a position anywhere between Bohemia and Berlin with our retreat to Berlin, we can on the defensive, keep the enemy at a distance from the capital only by accepting at some natural or artificial line of defence a frontal battle. If in this battle we are defeated by the enemy's superior numbers, we shall lose not only the battle but Berlin as well, and run the risk, if vigorously pursued, of being driven back to Stettin. If Berlin were fortified in the style of a great entrenched camp, it might well be assumed that the enemy's movement would there come to a standstill, the more so as he must invest Torgau and Wittenberg. But in that case we, too, should be tied to Berlin; we should have lost a considerable belt of territory, and the enemy could meanwhile complete the conquest of Silesia.

"The conditions are quite changed if we arrange for a retreat not to Berlin, but behind the Elbe.

"We do not believe that a flank position behind the Elbe will hold the enemy spellbound, or hinder him from advancing past it towards Berlin, but we expect this result from an offensive based upon the Elbe.

"It was shown that any attack from the west compels the enemy to front towards the west, to collect his forces on one of the more easterly parallel roads, to abandon the most direct road, the high road through Jüterbog, and to look round for other communications towards his rear, because in this new situation ours all lead us on to his left flank.

"If the offensive stroke delivered from the Elbe succeeds, it drives the enemy away from Bohemia, and back upon the, as yet, unconquered Silesia. If it fails, we shall find behind the river a more complete and nearer protection than by retreating northwards, and the strong places secure to us

the possibility of again advancing across the river after the shortest respite.

"This indirect defence will last the longer the higher up the river it begins, for if we were compelled to withdraw to the left bank at Dresden or Riesa, we should still be able to advance again on to the right bank at Torgau or Wittenberg. It will be the more effective the further down stream it is continued. For from Wittenberg, where our own retreat will be secured, we shall be operating directly upon the rear of the enemy who has advanced against Berlin.

"This, however, presupposes that Berlin itself can be protected for a few days, either by fortification or by the occupation of a line of defence to the south of the city. If that were not the case, the indirect defence would end at Wittenberg; it would have then to pass into direct defence, that is, we should have to hurry to reach Berlin before the enemy.

"Here comes out clearly the importance of a protection for the capital by works of some kind, without its being decided whether this should be effected by the fortification of Berlin itself, or of some position further south.

"If the line of the Nuthe and the Notte can be so prepared that it can be held even for a short time by a comparatively weak corps, that course is stragetically to be preferred even to the fortification proper of Berlin. For this line covers Berlin and Potsdam at the same time, and as it is only two marches from Wittenberg its existence increases the swift and powerful effect of an operation based upon that fortress, and, if necessary, also upon a bridge head at the mouth of the Elster.

"It will be seen from these considerations that, though our first concentration is assumed on the Elbe, we by no means intend to choose it behind the river upon the left bank. There, if we remained passive, we should probably not be attacked at all; we should be compelled to advance to the offensive, and we shall therefore do better at once to assemble our troops on the right bank, only with the conscious intention, in case retreat should become necessary, to retire not towards Berlin, but across the river. It is, of course, evident that if in every offensive advance we attack the enemy on his flank, that is, in a direction which, in case we succeed, drives him away from his base, we too on our side in case of failure shall be driven back in a direction which would separate us from the bulk of our own territory. But the difference which here tells in our favour is that a great river with protected crossings immediately

stops the pursuit in a direction which would be ruinous for us and enables us to renew our advance, and this is the exceedingly great advantage in which we find ourselves and of which the enemy is devoid. No group of fortresses would be able to secure for us the advantage which in this case a line of fortresses procures, especially if Dresden as a fortified point should also be in our power.

"If we can occupy Dresden earlier than the Austrians and can there establish ourselves, we should compel Saxony to go with us. If she did not, the Saxon Army must either withdraw into Bohemia or once more shut itself up in a fortified camp at Pirna; in either case, we should lay hands upon the rich resources of the country. If our principal force is assembled at Dresden (in this case on the left bank of the Elbe) the enemy cannot venture during his first advance through the mountains to employ the roads on both sides of the river—he must decide for one or the other bank. If he chooses the left bank we shall find opportunity when he debouches from the Erzgebirge to take the offensive against his columns separated by the deep rocky valleys. If, in spite of that, he succeeded in uniting them we should withdraw through Dresden, and the enemy would have to force the passage at some point in the face of our army. If the Austrians, as is probable, confine themselves only to the roads through the Lusatian Mountains from Kamnitz to Reichenberg, then the menace to their left flank and to their communications with Bohemia begins already from Dresden. That they should operate from Görlitz behind the Spree and the Spree-Wald against Berlin is not to be apprehended, for our base on the Elbe allows us to follow them in the direction of Spremberg. The line of the river with its fortresses offers us far greater advantages by lying parallel with the direction of the enemy's operations than if it formed a barrier crossing that direction.

"That in the active defence based upon the Elbe, decisive battles must take place immediately, is in no way to be regarded as a disadvantage. It would be a complete mistake to wish to save up our army. Once we have our corps together, there is nothing to be hoped for from further waiting; on the contrary, it would be very difficult to supply them long in that close concentration which is necessary for battle, and we cannot quickly enough bring about the decisive actions. The main decision must take place south of Berlin, and it is therefore of the greatest importance to be as strong as possible there. Still we shall not leave Silesia entirely unprotected, even if it were only in order not to allow the

enemy to use this province as a safe base for his main operation.

"What forces are to be destined for the protection of Silesia?

"In case the enemy's main attack were directed against Silesia our principal army would have to be brought up through Görlitz; against a subsidiary attack weaker forces would be able to maintain equilibrium by evading the blow. If, then, the enemy called up all or nearly all his forces for the offensive against Berlin, a few thousand men would suffice for such an interruption of his communications as would much embarrass him.

"We shall therefore hardly have to use more than one army corps for Silesia. If this corps were placed within the group of fortresses Neisse-Glatz-Schweidnitz, it would there no doubt cover Upper Silesia but hardly Breslau, and not at all Lower Silesia, the region so very important for the enemy's principal army. The corps then must be brought nearer to this district, and would find its first position, say, in the plain of Striegau, from which it could watch the mountain passes, and where in the first instance it covers the weak Schweidnitz. Against an equal force it would take the offensive into Bohemia and cut the enemy's main line of communications, which runs so near to the mountains.

"But in what direction must it retreat if opposed, as is probable, by superior numbers? Against superior numbers Breslau, which is unfortified, cannot be held even if our corps retires thither. We should only bring about the destruction of the town; the army corps would be driven back across the Oder, and would thus lose all connection with the rest of our forces.

"If Breslau were prepared as an entrenched camp, our corps could throw itself into the place and probably save the Silesian capital from falling into the enemy's possession and prevent the enemy from definitely establishing himself in the province. But in that case our corps, which we require in Lower Silesia, would also be tied fast to Breslau, would be unable even to prevent the siege of Schweidnitz, and would disappear from the operations in the field.

"In case of war with Austria we have no great army to spare which we might place in an entrenched camp at Breslau. But all that a weak detachment could there effect could be attained simply in local defence by garrison troops if it were possible to fortify the town as an ordinary fortress of the traditional type. In short, the capital of Silesia might be

worth fortifying for its own sake, but not with a view to its being a pivot for great operations. We desire to refuse Breslau to the enemy for the sake of the resources which it contains and of the moral impression of its conquest by the other side. But we do not wish to accumulate forces there; on the contrary, the purpose of fortifying the place is to make forces available elsewhere. If Breslau can be preserved only by a whole army, its local defence must be given up, and its possession or reconquest must be looked for from the operations in the field.

"But as Breslau at present is an open town, our Silesian corps must be based upon Glogau, which thus acquires considerable importance. The corps, if compelled to retire, must withdraw towards the north. Even at Liegnitz it still indirectly protects Breslau. Only in case of a superiority which would be to the advantage of our principal operation in the Marks, could the Austrian Army invading Silesia march upon Breslau before driving the defender to Glogau. This place allows the corps to evade the enemy by crossing over for a time on to the right bank, and secures the possibility of advancing against the communications of the enemy, even of his principal army, so soon as he turns against Breslau; it forms the pivot of the operations by which what has been temporarily lost may be regained should the great decisions in the Mark have resulted in our favour."

MEMOIR No. 2. (*Translation.*)

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST AUSTRIA, BAVARIA, AND FRANCE.

Berlin, June 3rd, 1862.

"It is doubtful whether Prussia will take the very strong measure of marching into Electoral Hesse. If she does, two cases may occur:

"Either this action will induce Austria, in consideration of her own difficult position, to acquiesce in the *fait accompli*, or Austria will induce the Confederation to take counter measures.

"In this latter case no other course is left for Prussia than to make herself master of the small States of Germany. To draw back would be more dangerous for us than lost battles—it would be political death. Any middle course leads to destruction, only the most absolute offensive to the goal.

"The principal opponents in this conflict which must sooner or later come to a decision are Austria, Bavaria, and probably France.

"Prussia will have to put up with the blockade of her ports by Denmark, perhaps by England, and with many other disadvantages; she must proceed against France and Bavaria in the first instance defensively, but before all things must overthrow the power of Austria.

"A possible Russian action against Prussia in any case requires time; in the first stage no notice need be taken of it.

"Against France our frontier is directly protected by Holland and Belgium, whose neutrality in this case would probably not be infringed; only the line of the Saar needs to be protected.

"France is for the moment engaged in Mexico, and her relations with Spain are strained. She cannot be willing to be without influence upon the development of affairs in Italy, and will be obliged to reinforce her garrison in Rome. Above all, she can never count with certainty upon England remaining faithful to the alliance with her if she herself declares war against Prussia.

"France will therefore not appear in the field with all her power against us, and can operate against us hardly otherwise than through South Germany.

"Whether the South Germans will go so far as to make common cause against France with Prussia, we must wait and see. The feeling of the people, and a good many political considerations, will render such a policy difficult for the Cabinets; an actual overthrow of the Prussian Monarchy is not in their interests.

"As regards England, that country requires, as against France, above all a strong land army, which England herself under her constitution can never have, and must therefore seek upon the Continent. Her policy towards France, bordering upon servility, rests upon her having been unable to find a sure support hitherto either in Spain, in Austria, or Prussia, and because the creation of an united Italy is prevented by France. The internal conditions of Austria and her war of 1859 prevented that monarchy, as Prussian policy hitherto prevented Prussia, from appearing as such a support.

"A vigorous and moderately successful action on the part of Prussia could not leave the Cabinet of St. James in doubt where its most important and most natural alliance is to be sought. But not until after we have acted can we count upon England. For the English, though they do not entirely

fail to recognize the power of Prussia, are in doubt, after 20 years of demonstrations, whether under any circumstances whatever Prussia will resolve to use it.

"Accordingly, at the beginning of the conflict, Prussia will be without any ally, but she will be able, by fighting, to gain allies, and that in Germany itself.

"The advantage of Prussia consists in the initiative.

"We can put our forces more rapidly in the field than all our German opponents. Success depends entirely upon the immediate and unconditional use of them.

"The constitution of the Confederation will be infringed by the fact of a march into Hesse; after that it need be no further considered. If the Confederation imposes conditions and obligations under which the Prussian State cannot exist with honour, there remains nothing but to destroy it—to make war against the Confederation.

"The mobilization of the whole army must be considered and prepared along with the first march into Hesse. The full horsing of one division in each artillery brigade will prepare for a speedy mobilization.

"So soon as the Confederation, that is Austria, protests, or if any kind of arming is undertaken in Germany, mobilization must be ordered.

"The VIII Army Corps will concentrate at Coblenz; the VII and IV move upon Hanau and Frankfurt; the III will concentrate at Magdeburg.

"Hanover can expect immediate support neither from the other contingents of the 10th Confederate Corps, nor from South Germany. Her attitude must be instantly defined or the Hanoverian contingent must be attacked and disarmed; for that purpose the the III Army Corps, and perhaps one division of the Guard, will be sufficient.

"Thereupon—or if an understanding with Hanover can be arranged immediately—the III Army Corps will move to the Main.

"The III, IV, VII, and VIII Corps will be placed under a single command.

"It is not probable that Bavaria, with 60,000 men against 125,000, will undertake anything before France comes to her assistance. In this case the Main Army will operate against the French Army upon the left bank of the Rhine, through the Bavarian Palatinate, and in so doing will probably have Baden and Würtemburg, and in any case all German sympathies on its side.

"It is possible that France will not declare herself at once; that she will first let the Germans tear one another to pieces

in order in a later campaign to reap the fruits for herself. In this case the Main Army will operate through Würtemburg against Bavaria. The all-important thing is to unite Germany against France by force.

"The Guard and II Corps will concentrate at Elsterwerda the I, V, and VI at Görlitz.

"The two former will immediately march upon Dresden and compel Saxony to declare herself for or against us.

"All five corps will then converge, with 160,000 men, upon Prague."

[At the same time with the preceding memoir, and in connection with it, Moltke wrote a paper in which he worked out the comparison between the military and political situation of Saxony at this period and the situation of the same State at the beginning of the Seven Years' War; this paper is:—]

MEMOIR No. 3. (*Précis.*)

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SAXONY.

Advance against Saxony. The Saxons in 1756 had 17,000 men, and Frederick the Great invaded Saxony with 67,500 men in three columns. The Saxon Court hesitated to order the retreat of its army into Bohemia to join its Austrian Allies, and the consequence was, after several weeks' delay, the capitulation of the Saxon Army.

Moltke thinks that if war should now break out the Saxon Court will again have to choose between ordering the retreat of its army into Bohemia to join the Austrians and exposing it to be surrounded and captured by a superior force of Prussians. He considers that the best course for the Saxon Court would be to evacuate Saxony and unite its forces with those of Austria, but he works out the arrangements for the march of the Prussian forces so that in case the Saxon Army attempts to hold a position it may be surrounded and captured, while if it evacuates Saxony the Prussians may occupy Dresden and continue their advance into Bohemia.

[On the 4th of March, 1865, the Minister of War wrote to Moltke asking him—First, What is the present strength of the whole Austrian Army under arms? Secondly, How much

time does it require in order to be able to begin a war on a large scale? Thirdly, Apart from the necessary money, does it possess an adequate supply of all the other objects of equipment necessary for such a purpose? Moltke's reply is:—]

No. 4. (*Précis.*)

To the Minister of War, Lieutenant-General von Roon.

March, 1865.

A detailed account of the forces of the Austrian Army, and of the numbers of troops available for operations in Italy, against Russia, against Prussia, and against France. The case which Moltke here has in view is that of an Austro-Prussian alliance against France. In that case he thinks that Austria's interest would be to put her main force in Italy and to make conquests there; that Prussia would have to bear the brunt of the French attack, and, though she could do this, would gain less than Austria would gain in Italy, if the small German States should be on the side of France; Prussia and Austria might divide Germany between them, following the line of the Main; he thinks Austria and Prussia united represent a very great force, but he would prefer an alliance for specific action defined in advance, to a general alliance involving a mutual guarantee of their possessions by each of the two Powers.

No. 5. (*Précis.*)

Addressed to Colonel von Sperling.

Berlin, October, 1865.

A note to Colonel von Sperling, Chief of Staff of VI Corps, criticising a plan for concentrating that corps between Brieg–Oppeln–Falkenberg and suggesting that Captain von Kaltenborn should calculate the time required to concentrate the VI Corps between Striegau, Schweidnitz, and Landeshut.

No. 6.

Memorandum worked out during the Winter of 1865 to 1866.

(1) *General Plan.* (*Translation.*)

"Prussia will not voluntarily bring about a war in which two or three of the great Powers attack her simultaneously.

"It must therefore be assumed that we shall not declare war against Austria until we have some guarantee that we shall not, at least not at the beginning, be disturbed by France or Russia. If we had only to leave two army corps on the Rhine, and two on the Vistula in observation, we should not have force enough for a vigorous offensive towards the south.

"In a war against Austria in the present situation we should certainly have Saxony against us, perhaps Denmark, and probably also South Germany. Hanover, Nassau, and Hesse would be doubtful neighbours, Italy probably an active ally, for if the Italians intend to realize their hopes of a united Italy, now is their time.

"For us the most important factor in the combination is Austria, whose army at full war strength numbers 544,000 combatants. At the present time Italy can place in the field for attack against Venetia more than 200,000 men. We can therefore assume with certainty that Austria cannot withdraw any troops from Venetia, Tyrol, and Dalmatia, where there are at present 80,400 men.

"These forces on a war footing amount to a minimum of 171,400 men, even if only the defensive is intended.

"The situation in Hungary and the Slavonian districts cannot yet be accurately foreseen; it embarrasses Austria, and might become so serious as to prevent her carrying on war at all.

"But when it is a question of the existence of her Empire, and when by overthrowing Prussia, Austria can gain full compensation for any sacrifices made outside of Germany, we must expect the Cabinet of Vienna to make very considerable sacrifices to Hungary in order to have its forces free.

If we assume that Austria can keep order in the interior north of the Alps, merely by Ersatz troops and depôts supported only by a reserve of 30,000 men, then the Austrian Government can assemble against us in Northern Bohemia 240,000 men, for whom some 25,000 Saxons at Dresden would serve as an advance guard—full total 265,000 men.

"It may well be that these figures will not be reached; the force allowed for Italy seems hardly sufficient to meet the danger of being shut off from the sea for all time. It will be difficult to content the Hungarians and the Poles, and the thorough disorder of the Austrian finances must not be forgotten; but it is impossible to deny the possibility that Austria might deploy a force such as has just been described, and with this we must count.

"In the war against Prussia, Austria's goal will probably be not directly to conquer Silesia and afterwards to defend it, but to obtain the greatest possible advantages by the overthrow of the power of Prussia.

"Berlin is only six marches distant from the unprotected border conterminous with Saxony, which will not oppose the passage of an Austrian army but will rather assist it by its own forces. No fortress and no marked line of defence bars an advance in this direction; our whole theatre of war as far as the sea is only about 140 miles in depth. The loss of Berlin cuts the State in two, cuts all communications from the Rhine to the Vistula, and would politically be infinitely more important than the loss of Breslau or of all Silesia, for the reconquest of which all our forces could be assembled.

"Part of our Army will therefore have to be employed for the defence of the capital. In presence of a superior hostile force this part will have to conduct the defence from an offensive flank position, based upon the fortresses of the Elbe.

"The doubtful point is whether we shall concentrate our principal force in Lusatia or in Silesia. By putting them in Lusatia we cover Brandenburg directly, Silesia indirectly; by putting them in Silesia we cover Silesia directly and Brandenburg indirectly, for the main Austrian Army cannot march upon Berlin while we are advancing from Silesia upon Vienna or Prague. It would certainly be correct to assemble an army in Upper Silesia ready for an advance towards Vienna if we could appear sooner and in greater force than the Austrians upon the scene of action.

"But neither the one nor the other is the case.

"Our calculations show that it is possible for Austria to assemble her forces in about the same time in Bohemia as we can assemble ours in Lusatia.

"If Austria concentrates in Moravia she saves time; if we concentrate in Upper Silesia we lose time.

"Our doubtful neighbours—Hanover, Hesse, and Nassau—we can perhaps drive into neutrality by concentrating the VII Army Corps; we have no time to compel them to be our active allies, and they are not worth the trouble.

"We may assume that Denmark will not, in the first instance, be ready for war, but we must certainly count upon the South German States as enemies allied with Austria, Bavaria, Würtemburg, and possibly Baden can concentrate 80,000 men at Bamberg, and join hands with the Austro-Saxon Army on the Elbe.

"This army will take much longer to put into position than paper calculations show. If we concentrate the VIII at Mainz, and it promptly takes the offensive, it may prevent the South German Army from assembling, and will certainly prevents its co-operation with the Austrians; we shall then have eight army corps against the principal enemy.

"The only fortresses that require fully arming at the start are Cosel, Neisse, Glatz, Glogau, Torgau, and perhaps Erfurt; all our other places can be occupied by Ersatz troops and by Landwehr; the forts on the Rhine, except Saarlouis and Luxembourg, require no garrison of line troops; they will be sufficiently protected against South Germany by our detachment at Mainz, and if we should be driven from Mainz, there will still be time to garrison them with troops of the line.

	Men.
116 battalions of Landwehr at 400 men each	46,400
And 83 Ersatz battalions at 1,002 men ...	83,166
	129,566

Quite enough in the first instance for all our garrisons.

"We shall then have left for the field 247,000 men, about equal to the largest force that Austria can possibly bring against us.

"We must then give up the idea of concentrating in Upper Silesia, where the army would protect Prussia only if it were strong enough to advance past Olmütz and Brünn to Vienna and so draw the enemy after us, and strong enough then to continue the offensive, or at least to maintain the ground won. For on the defensive the position in Upper Silesia, 187 miles away, would not prevent the enemy from advancing along the Elbe. To await his attack from the west in Silesia would not be advisable, for a battle lost in that situation might drive us into Poland.

"With the circumstances as they are, the only question is whether we are to assemble our principal force behind the Lusatian Mountains or behind the Giant Mountains. The latter position protects most of Silesia directly, and indirectly protects the Marks against an Austrian advance on the right

bank of the Elbe, while an advance on the left bank of the Elbe would not be dangerous for us, and therefore would be improbable. But the position behind the Lusatian Mountains also indirectly protects Silesia; in both cases, however, this protection depends not upon the defensive but upon an advance to attack, for which purpose the Lusatian Mountains offer greater facilities of movement than either the Giant Mountains or their southern prolongation. The Lusatian Mountains have in a short stretch no less than seven roads converging upon Prague, the Giant Mountains have very few practicable roads, and these lie a good way apart from one another.

"In favour of a concentration behind the Giant Mountains is the nearness of the army there assembled to the detachment, which would in any case have to be devoted to the direct protection of Silesia, but a concentration in Lusatia relieves us from detaching any force for the direct protection of Berlin.

"The troops which would have to be sent immediately before mobilization to occupy Saxony would cover the subsequent advance of our corps upon Dresden.

"If we lose a battle north or south of the Lusatian Mountains we can retreat and find protection behind the Elbe, and recross at Torgau or Wittenberg to attack the enemy's flank if he advances upon Berlin.

"An army behind the Giant Mountains, and beaten, cannot get the same advantages by crossing the Oder at Glogau and recrossing it at Küstrin, for these places are too far from the enemy's direct line of advance.

"In case of a victory or a series of victories the line from Silesia to Vienna passes so near to Olmütz and Brünn that we should probably have to undertake a lengthy siege, but the line from Lusatia by Prague and Iglau would be amply covered by the mere observation of Olmütz and Brünn.

Projected Concentration.

	Men.
(1) At Mainz—	
VIII Army Corps and the garrison at Mainz	52,000
(2) Principal army in Lusatia—	
VII, IV, and Guard Corps, Dresden and East of Dresden	94,000
I, II, and III Corps, Görlitz and West of Görlitz...	99,000
Part of IV and Guard sent in advance, before mobilization, to seize Saxony.	

"The assembly takes 14 days; difficult to feed the whole force at one point, so we take two railway termini, Dresden and Görlitz, 47 miles apart; each wing of three corps must have its own commander. The whole can be concentrated in two days for defence at Bautzen, and in three days for offensive at Jung Bunzlau.

	Men.
(3) V and VI Corps at Freiburg–Schweidnitz	54,000

Distribution of the whole Army.

	Men.	Men.
On the Main (excluding Mainz) ...	33,000	
In Lusatia	193,000	
In Silesia	54,000	
In Schleswig	14,000	
		294,000*
In the fortresses—		
Line troops	32,000	
Ersatz troops	100,000	
Landwehr in the first instance ...	46,000	
		178,000
Grand total ...		472,000

"If the Austrians, as is probable, concentrate in Northern Bohemia they will be upon the interior line of operations. They can turn against the Marks and will then strike upon our principal forces. In that case the decisive battle will come on at once. But they may also, starting from Moravia, advance into Silesia, leaving a corps of observation on the Elbe, and in this case they will push back our V and VI Corps. These corps will not be able to defend Breslau, and must retire in the direction of Lauban.

"In this case our principal army has the choice between two operations:—

(1) It concentrates in four marches upon the line Görlitz-Zittau. The Austrians cannot advance against Berlin between this position and Glogau without sacrificing all their communications, so that there must be a battle in the neighbourhood of Löwenberg–Jauer in conditions strategetically and numerically in our favour.

(2) The principal army advances into Bohemia and thus has the prospect of delivering with great superiority a

* Active army.

deadly blow against the portion of the Austrian Army left there. If this movement does not draw the Austrians back out of Silesia the principal army will then turn in that direction. In that case both armies will be equally in a critical situation, for both will have to fight the battle with an inverted front.

"The special circumstances, and in particular the numerical force which Austria leaves behind in Bohemia, will decide the choice between these two operations. Against a weak detachment the latter would be a blow in the air, but against either the smaller or the greater half of the Austrian Army it might lead to an important victory. Moreover, it transfers the war to the enemy's territory.

"It remains to consider whether the Austrians, using their best possible means of preparation, can disturb our concentration if it is fixed at points so far to the front."

(2) *Measures to be taken against Saxony.* (Précis.)

The Saxon Army, 24,000 men, can be ready in 14 days at Dresden. If we wait to complete our battalions before invading Saxony we shall be in front of Dresden with a superior force before the Austrians can assist the Saxons, but we shall not be able to prevent the Saxon Army from retiring and forming a valuable reinforcement to the Austrians.

The only way to prevent this is to surprise and disarm the Saxon troops in their quarters before they are on a war footing, and before they are concentrated. If this is to be accomplished it must be done by battalions of our own sent on on a peace footing.

The Saxon Army on a peace footing has about 8,000 men concentrated in 18 different garrisons, having at Dresden 3,500 men, at Leipzig 700, at Chemnitz and Bautzen 500 men each, and nowhere else more than 300 men. The garrisons when attacked will all make for Dresden, which is, therefore, the decisive point.

We must therefore send—

(*a*) 10,000 men by Röderau;
(*b*) 4,000 men from Halle through Leipzig towards Chemnitz;
(*c*) 2,000 men from Görlitz towards Löbau.

These three columns will reach Dresden, Leipzig, and Löbau on the third day, and if the Dresden column has the start the Saxon garrisons will not be able to concentrate anywhere.

The Dresden column will then take a defensive position at Hohenstein, or Pirna, watching the roads to Bohemia on both banks of the Elbe, and covering the arrival of the VII, IV, and Guard Corps at Dresden. The Leipzig column will move through Chemnitz to Annaberg and watch the mountain passes, the Löbau column will occupy Zittau and observe Rumburg.

Saxony will thus be invaded on the first day of the mobilization; an ultimatum must, therefore, be sent to Dresden two days previously.

If we are to succeed in our *coup* against Mainz and against Saxony, we must not mobilize before we declare war, but the first day of mobilization must be the day on which war is declared; moreover, so soon as any one of our neighbours begins to arm we must at once mobilize and declare war in order to secure the initiative.

Calculation (not reproduced) to show that Austria cannot possibly prevent the blow aimed against Saxony.

(3) *Calculation of Forces.* (Précis.)

The result is the following comparison between the two field armies:—

	Prussian.		Austrian.
	321,000	against	383,000
Deduct for Holstein	12,000		14,000
„ Saarlouis, Mainz, and Luxembourg	20,000		
„ Eastern fortresses	12,000		
Total deductions	44,000	Total available	369,000
Balance available	277,000		

We should, therefore, be equal to the Austrians if they had to leave 92,000 men in Italy.

(4) *Western Half of the Monarchy.* (Translation.)

(*a*) Draft Plan of Operations.

"Bavaria and the South German States together can put 80,000 men into the field. If these were assembled at Bamberg they would be able to co-operate with the Austrian Army against the centre of the Prussian monarchy.

"The South Germans would do this only if they were sure of not being disturbed at home, that is, if we had brought our two corps from the Rhine for the defence of the Marks.

"But if there is a Prussian detachment on the Main ready to take the offensive, Nassau and the two Hesses will never lend their troops to Bavaria, and even Baden and Würtemburg will insist upon a concentration which would protect them.

"In that case the best point of concentration for the South German forces would be Aschaffenburg, but they would hardly have time to collect there before being attacked, and would have to be contented, say, with Würzburg; it is, therefore, desirable that we should make sure of Mainz, and place there, in addition to the garrison, a mobile force of 30,000 men.

"Whether we then move to attack Würzburg must depend upon events. In any case we shall prevent the South Germans from co-operating with our principal enemy.

"With Mainz in our possession we shall be so strong for defence that we need fear nothing for the Rhine province.

"The fortresses, except Saalouis and Luxembourg, need be garrisoned only by Ersatz and Landwehr battalions, for they cannot be threatened until we are driven away from Mainz, and there will then be time to complete the garrisons.

"Even if the Bavarians invaded the Rhine province the issue would really depend upon events in Bohemia."

* * * * *

(*b*) Calculation of Forces. (*Précis.*)

N.B.—Of course the VIII Army Corps must be brought *viâ* Würzburg–Hof to the main army so soon as our relations with France and the situation in South Germany permit.

In the course of February, relations between Prussia and Austria became strained. The following memorandum deals with the question whether Prussia ought at once to arm:—

No. 7. (*Translation.*)

February 22nd, 1866.

"Austrian measures have the appearance of aggression. It is politically important to give time for this to become clear to Germany and to Europe.

"The impression in our favour would be destroyed if we also were to arm. The question is how long we can wait without danger.

"Austria can collect from—

	Men.
Bohemia	30,000
Moravia	17,000
Galicia	20,000
Total	67,000

and can bring these forces by detachments from Austria-Hungary up to 100,000 men, which can be assembled in Northern Bohemia on the 21st day.

"But Austria cannot attack Prussia with 100,000 men.

"To collect a larger force a longer time is required:—

For 150,000 men	28 days,
„ 200,000 „	36 „

The advance to the Prussian border will require eight days more, so that our frontiers cannot be passed until after six weeks.

"The mobilisation of a force of this size involves measures which cannot be kept secret.

"The Austrian Army requires altogether 53,000 horses.

"Austria cannot think of war against Prussia without also arming against Italy, but at present there are only 114,000 men, including garrisons in Venetia, Dalmatia, and the Tyrol, a force which, if the fortresses were fully armed, would leave for operations in the field only 40,000 men.

"Accordingly, as long as the purchase of horses on a large scale has not been ordered, and the regiments in Italy are not placed on a war footing, we need not believe that there is serious intention to attack us.

"The movements of troops towards Bohemia which have as yet taken place probably mean no more than a demonstration with the concurrent object of encouraging Saxony to take the Austrian side.

"Reinforcements sent to Italy, except from Croatia, must pass through Vienna, where they cannot escape notice."

At a Council on February 28th, Bismarck proposed that Moltke should be sent to Florence to negotiate a treaty with Italy. On March 3rd Bismarck and Moltke met and discussed this question. On the 5th Moltke wrote to Bismarck:—

No. 8. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Bismarck.

Berlin, March 5th, 1866.

Moltke thinks Italy will hardly make a treaty unless Prussia pledges herself to go to war, and fix the date; he thinks the military points should be:—

(1) To put in the field, exclusive of garrisons—

Prussia	...	...	...	300,000 men.
Italy	...	...	...	220,000 „

(2) Four weeks after Prussia has resolved to go to war —this is the weak point of the whole business—to put these troops down on the border threatened by the enemy (we must not specify the Austrian border because perhaps the Bavarian border would suit us better).

(3) Then at once to take the offensive.

(4) Not to make peace nor to pause in the operations until both sides have secured the object of the war.

By object of the war is meant not merely the occupation of Venetia and Bohemia by the allies, but Austria's agreement to cede those countries.

* * * * *

Moltke thinks there should be no stipulations about the operation because they will be carried on independently upon entirely separate theatres of war by each side in its own interest, and therefore with energy, and the advantage lies not in combination between them but in their simultaneity.

No. 9. (*Précis.*)

Moltke's Draft of an Alliance.

It is a *pactum de contrahendo.*

No. 10. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Bismarck.

Berlin, March 20th, 1866.

A general review of the forces available in Italy.

(Moltke thinks the Italians will not have more than 200,000 men for an offensive.)

No. 11. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Herwarth von Bittenfeld (commanding VIII Army Corps.)

13th March, 1866.

On the means of seizing Mainz.

No. 12. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Manteuffel, Governor of Schleswig.

A note of necessary measures in Schleswig. Düppel and Sonderburg to be specially fortified.

No. 13. (*Précis.*)

Notes for an interview with Herwarth. Details of the *coup* against Mainz.

No. 14. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Roon.

March 24th.

A note of what the Austrians are doing :—Hitherto nothing from which an intention to attack can be inferred.

No. 15. (*Translation.*)

March 26th.

"Karoly said on 25th that the Austrian measures in Bohemia and Moravia were purely defensive, no horses had been bought for teams and no men called out.

"Bismarck had observed upon this that the latter part of the statement contradicted the information in possession of the Prussian Government."

No. 16. (*Précis.*)

Notes for the Council of Ministers on March 28th. Austria has taken the initiative in arming, and gained the advantage of being able to assemble an army in Bohemia quicker than we could put down an equal force opposite to it at a single point.

Even if we had at once replied with preparatory or partial measures, we could not have prevented their gaining this advantage, which is the result of the readiness and distribution of the Austrian forces, and of their having been the first to make up their minds.

Review of the Preparations.

Austria, with the Saxons, could, while advancing with the Moravian Corps into Silesia, advance from Bohemia with an army which, reinforced by the Saxons, would amount to about 100,000 men between Dresden and Bautzen.

This force might cause us some disadvantages at the start, but is not sufficient for a serious attack upon Prussia; it is therefore important to ascertain whether Austria is making further preparations. So soon as we have trustworthy information that Austria is buying up horses on a large scale and sending reservists to Italy, we ought not to delay for a moment the mobilization of the whole army.

Austria probably does not intend to attack us, but might make up her mind to take that course on perceiving that she could put 100,000 men on our frontier before we had made any preparations.

Measures considered necessary now :—

Arming of Cosel, Neisse, Glatz, Torgau, and Wittenberg.

VI, I, and Guard Corps to be ready to march without being mobilized, but provided with necessary teams.

Artillery teams for these three corps, and for the 9th, 6th, and 7th Divisions. Austrians would take, with Saxons, about 14 days to be at Dresden, and four more to reach the frontier; they probably could not disturb our concentration at Torgau under three weeks. If Austria has decided for war so that she can in eight or ten days invade Saxony and Silesia, we ought at once to mobilize the army.

Most important would be the protection of Berlin, which would in that case be our only point of concentration. For this purpose we should have to move the Guard, I, III, and IV Army Corps to Torgau—130,000 men, in about 21 days; this would suffice to prevent the Austro-Saxon forces as yet ready from advancing towards Berlin.

VI Corps at Neisse–Frankenstein, V at Freiburg—together 59,000 men—would probably suffice to stop the advance from Moravia. VII, VIII, and II Corps at Berlin, and possibly VIII Corps at Wittenberg—96,000 men—would reinforce the army at Torgau and then take the offensive towards Dresden.

NOTES ON THE AUSTRIAN ARMAMENTS.

(Not dealt with.)

No. 17.

Moltke to Roon.

March 29th.

No. 18.

Moltke to Roon.

March 31st.

No. 19.

Moltke to Bismarck.

April 1st.

No. 20.

Moltke to General War Department.

April 2nd.

No. 21. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Roon.

April 3rd.

* * * * *

Austria has got the start in arming. But if, taking the present situation into account, we assume that the general mobilization begins at the same time on both sides, the military situation from the first day on will be as follows:—

	AUSTRIANS.	PRUSSIANS.
On the 8th day	50,000	—
On the 14th day	74,000	33,000
On the 18th day (43,000 from Galicia, Moravia, and Austria)....	117,000	143,000
On the 25th day (42,000 from Austria and Hungary)	159,000	285,000
On the 28th day (20,000 from Austria and Hungary)	179,000	285,000
On the 42nd day (60,000 from Austria and Hungary)	239,000	285,000

Accordingly the chances for Prussia lie between the 18th and 42nd days. Every day that Austria gets the start in arming is a day lost for us out of this incalculably important period for operations.

[In the beginning of April Bavaria began to arm. The following memorandum takes note of the effect of Bavaria's joining against Prussia :—]

MEMOIR No. 22. (*Translation.*)

April 2nd.

"The war against Austria, its probability or inevitableness as a political question is outside my judgment. But from my point of view, I think I ought to express the conviction that success or failure in this war essentially depends upon our determination to fight being reached sooner than that of the Austrians, and, if possible, now.

"Our advantage, which we cannot value too highly, consists in being able by the use of five railway lines to bring up our Army and have it in all essentials concentrated on the Bohemian-Saxon frontier in 25 days.

"Austria has only one railway to Bohemia, and allowing for the troops she already has in Bohemia and Galicia, and assuming that her cavalry is already on the march, she requires 45 days to get together 200,000 men.

"If Bavaria joins Austria the disadvantage to us is not so much the Bavarian Army, as the probability that Bavaria will lend the Austrians her railway Regensberg—Pilsen—Prague, which will shorten the Austrian concentration by 15 days.

"If the mobilization of the Prussian Army is ordered now, Bavaria will hardly be able to get her 40,000 men collected at Bamberg before the first battle between Austria and Prussia has been fought. The assembly of a Bavarian Army can hardly have the aim of besieging Coblentz, or Cologne, or Erfurt, or of seizing Prussian territory, but more probably of waiting upon events and then taking the side of the victor.

"For us the important point is to strike down Austria, and for that purpose we ought to call up all our forces, including not only the VII but also the VIII Army Corps.

"We must, of course, seize Mainz, so as to prevent any invasion of the Rhine province; in that case the VII

and VIII Army Corps will be a more direct threat upon Munich if they advance to Prague, than if they are concentrated at Mainz.

"If we can manage to prevent Bavaria from allowing the Austrians to use the railway from Reichenberg, we shall still have the advantage of the initiative, provided we mobilize the army at once.

"If Austria wants the alliance of Saxony she must assist in the defence of that country; we shall be at Dresden with the IV, VII, and VIII, and Guard Corps on the 31st day with 100,000 men.

"If the Austrians advance with all that they now have in Bohemia to the support of Saxony we should there find only 74,000 men.

"For upon only one line the Austrians could not, before the 31st day, get more than 100,000 men together, and they would be compelled to face our I, II, III, V, and VI Corps, which make together more than 150,000 men.

"We should therefore probably have a great superiority both in Saxony and in Bohemia for the first battles.

"But if the Austrians are allowed to use the Bavarian line they can bring up by the 31st day their maximum force of 240,000 men.

"Whether their finances and the political situation will allow the Austrians to deploy such a force is a question I need not decide. A military calculation can only count with given magnitudes, with the normal figures of the war establishment, and with the capacity of the means of transport. But the result depends not merely on the size of the bodies of troops, but also upon the time with which these can be brought into action on both sides, and it is just in this connection, as has been shown, that the attitude of Bavaria is an important factor. Apart from this her arming matters very little."

[The King, after reading this, began to be very much afraid that the Prussian Army was not large enough for the war, and still more afraid when he thought that the hostility of South Germany might oblige him to use the VII and VIII Corps against that country, and so diminish the equality which he hoped to have in Bohemia. Roon wrote to Moltke to suggest that he should write something to encourage the King. Moltke replied :—]

No. 23. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Roon.

April 5th.

I wrote to the King in exactly the same words as No. 21.

I have always told you and the King that if we give them time the Austrians can assemble as many troops as we can.

The point is not the absolute number of troops on both sides, but the time required by both sides to bring them into action.

The table at the end of No. 21 was intended to make quite clear the advantage we shall have during three whole weeks if we take the initiative or order our mobilization at the same time as the Austrians.

It can be no one's intention to persuade the King to begin a war like this, but only to make it easier for him to make up his own mind by truly and clearly explaining the real situation.

This situation will really be changed if Bavaria takes Austria's side, not by the Bavarian Army but by the possibility of the Bavarian line Reichenberg–Prague being used by the Austrians to transport their troops, which will save them 15 days.

No. 24. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Roon.

April 5th.

Note on the Austrian armaments, thinks on the whole that there is in the military preparations a pause of which the general purpose is to bring the more distant troops nearer to the probable theatre of war.

No. 25. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Roon.

April 7th.

Thinks that about March 20th or 21st the order was given to stop a concentration of troops which had been ordered and had begun. The Austrian force in Bohemia now amounts to 53,000 men.

No. 26. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Roon.

April 12th.

That all the cavalry now on the march have reached their destinations. The force in Northern Bohemia will amount to 56,000 men.

No. 27. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Bismarck.

April 12th.

Up to the end of March the Austrian forces available against Silesia formed the cadres for an army of 82,000 men, a larger force than the Prussian force in the neighbouring provinces.

During the last 14 days Prussia has taken no counter measures.

The Prussian measures ordered on March 28th are purely defensive, and consist in arming the border fortresses, increasing the battalions in Silesia to the normal peace establishment, and increasing the number of horses of the artillery so that there are now 108 guns horsed in Silesia.

We believe that four further cavalry regiments are marching into Bohemia and four more from Galicia into Moravia. When these have arrived the force in the Austrian provinces can be brought up by calling in reserves to 88,000 men, while if we mobilize the troops we have in Silesia their strength will only be 45,000.

No. 28. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Roon.

April 16th.

Hears that the Austrians are buying 8,000 horses. This, if true, proves that the Austrians are extending their armaments.

No. 29. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Roon.

April 21st.

Austrians are calling in reserves in the border provinces. Their purchase of horses confirmed, though the figures given on the 16th prove incorrect.

No. 30. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Roon.

April 26th.

Austrians buying horses; their artillery is on a war footing; a great magazine has been formed at Prerau.

Two cavalry regiments from Galicia have reached Moravia, two from the Banate have reached Vienna.

Theresienstadt and Josephstadt have been armed and are being extended. Fortifications are being constructed at Königgrätz and Krakau.

Evidently no stoppage of military preparations.

Saxony is arming. Details.

No. 31. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Roon.

April 28th.

Austrian armaments continue; more horses; reserves called out both for Italy and Bohemia; trains are being horsed.

Armament of fortresses continues.

No. 32. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Roon.

April 29th.

Austrians mobilizing their Grenz (*i.e.*, border) regiments, equivalent to 40 battalions, and buying supplies for magazines.

No. 33. (*Précis.*)

Moltke to Roon.

May 2nd.

No longer possible to doubt that the mobilization of the Austrian Army which has been gradually begun and carried on will shortly be complete. The troops in Bohemia and Moravia are already in a condition that admits of their taking the field. Fortification and collection of supplies in Krakau, Moravia, and Bohemia continue. Troops collecting at Prague, which looks as though the transport to the frontier had begun. Saxon armaments continue.

[Meanwhile Moltke continued to work out his schemes for concentration and for operations as given in the following papers :—]

No. 34. (*Précis.*)

March 30th.

The Austrians can now advance with 31,500 men upon Dresden, with 17,500 men upon Landeshut or Glatz.

Upper Silesia is not yet threatened, as a corps would have to be concentrated for the purpose between Oderburg and Oswiecim.

These 49,000 men cannot advance by Dresden or Bautzen towards Berlin if we have any considerable detachments ready to threaten the Austrian communications passing through Pardubitz–Trübau.

But 31,500 or more Austrians with 24,000 Saxons might make 55,000 or 60,000 at Dresden–Bautzen.

They could not advance upon Berlin unless the Saxon contingent had first been mobilized and was willing to march upon Berlin while a Prussian force was threatening Leipzig.

The measures ordered on March 29th will not facilitate the concentration of our Army, but they will permit of forming the protection of our concentration advance guards made up of bodies of the three arms not mobilized and not on a war footing.

Detailed calculations follow.

Desirable to put a small force at Görlitz to prevent any sudden Austrian move against Kohlfurt.

The Austrian preparations as yet are far from sufficient for an attack on Prussia, but there are now lying on the Austrian railways troops amounting to 85,000 men, and at more distant points 60,000 more; if, then, the Austrian transports continue and policy still forbids our mobilization of the whole army, we ought at least to mobilize without trains the V and VI Corps.

No. 35. (*Précis.*)

March 31st.

	Men.
Now in Bohemia	53,000
Can be brought from Hungary, &c. ...	80,000
Assembling in Austrian Silesia and Galicia	18,000
Together	151,000

This will leave 47 fourth battalions which cannot move till their depôts have been formed. I calculate that to transport the above forces to Bohemia will take 31 days, to Austrian Silesia 18 days; by that time the Saxon Army will be ready, 24,000 men. General total, 175,000 men.

If we order a general mobilization at the same time as the Austrians, we shall be able to put down a force very superior to that just summed up, and it is evident that the defects of the Austrian railway system will give us great advantages if we take the initiative.

For we can put in the field in 27 days 285,000 men, a force against which the Austrians as yet would not have all their 175,000.

The Austrian armaments are probably intended to diminish this disadvantage; but we must not fix our points of assembly at places which could be reached by the forces already assembled in Bohemia.

The concentration of IV, VII, and VIII at Torgau is safe enough; it will be finished in 25 days, and on the 19th day, the earliest upon which an Austro-Saxon corps could reach Torgau, we should have 40,000 men at that point.

The Guard, too, though not at full strength, could reach the *rendezvous* in time by the Wittenberg line, and 125,000 men would be a sufficient indirect protection for Berlin.

But in face of the forces now in Bohemia we cannot safely concentrate an army either at Görlitz or Freiburg, for the Austrians by the Dresden and Reichenberg lines can in three days collect 30 battalions at Löbau, two marches from Kohlfurt, or at Freiburg.

We can safely assemble I, II, and III at Berlin, but it would then be difficult to support V and VI in Silesia, or to prevent the invasion of that province. These two corps could only unite at Breslau or Glogau. Upper Silesia will be threatened after the 18th day, and the border from Görlitz to Glatz immediately. To cover our concentration and the mobilization of V and VI, we must protect Görlitz and Landeshut and observe Upper Silesia.

Proposes to concentrate:—

12th	Division	...	...	... Frankenstein.
11th	„	...	...	... Freiburg.
9th	„	...	...	... Görlitz.

No. 36. (*Précis.*)

April 1st.

An improved paraphrase of No. 35.

No. 37. (*Précis.*)

To Colonel von Sperling, Chief of the Staff of VI Army Corps.

March 30th.

Recapitulates Nos. 17, 34, and 36, asks what battalions VI Corps has moved into fortresses, and asks for Sperling's view of the situation.

No. 38. (*Précis.*)

April 3rd.

I.

Assume that Austria has already decided upon war;

That transports for eight trains a day are ready on the railway from Vienna to Prague; Men.

That by April 15th 28,000

will be moved to Bohemia, besides the there present 56,000

84,000

And that Prussia orders general mobilization on April 15th;

On April 18th the Saxons will have at Dresden 24,000

108,000

(A) Austrians take the offensive towards Berlin, leaving on April 18th; 28,000 men for communications (8,000 to enclose Glatz, 20,000 at Canth, near Breslau); 80,000 men at Dresden–Bautzen.

Our V and VI Corps assemble behind the Oder with 50,000 men after leaving garrisons in Glatz, Neisse, and Cosel. These two corps take the offensive on April 30th. By April 30th 18,000 Austrians from Galicia have reached the Neisse —just sufficient to invest Cosel and Neisse. Also 42,000 men from Hungary and Austria have reached Bohemia. Of these 22,000 men must be sent to support the force invading Silesia. I Corps concentrates at Breslau.

20,000 Austrians reinforce the main army, which reaches on the 24th Torgau–Herzberg, and on the 26th Wittenberg–Jüterbog. This army, after investing the bridge head of Torgau and Wittenberg, is 90,000 strong, and reaches Berlin on April 30th.

By April 30th there will be at Berlin :—

Of the Guard		25,000
Of III Corps		31,000
Of II Corps		15,000
... ...	Total	71,000

IV concentrates at Halle, immediately enters Leipzig (April 24th), covering the line to Cosel; this will prevent the Saxons going to Berlin and reduce the Austrian force there to an equality with the Prussians.

VIII to Leipzig.

VII from Magdeburg either to Berlin or to Wittenberg.

May 9th. If VII has gone to Berlin there will be there on May 9th :—

Guard, II, III, and VII	130,000
Riesa or Dresden, IV and VIII ...	62,000
Freiburg, I, V, and VI	93,000
	285,000

By May 9th the Austrian force can have been increased to 200,000. Of these (on account of the communications—Prague–Olmütz) hardly less than 100,000 can be intended for Silesia.

Moreover, the Austrian main army must be back in Bohemia before May 9th, or it will be attacked in front and left flank by 192,000 men. It would therefore have to turn back on the day when it reached Berlin.

This advance is therefore impracticable. If this advance is not made, VII may be sent from Magdeburg to Wittenberg.

(B) Austria takes the offensive against Silesia with 60,000, placing at Dresden 24,000. If the Austrian Army has been concentrated by the 15th at Friedland and Trautenau, and leaves 10,000 men to invest Glatz and parties to observe Nachod and Mittelwalde, it may on April 22nd reach Breslau with 50,000 men.

On April 22nd also the corps from Silesia, 18,000, crosses the Silesian border.

On April 22nd, the eighth day of mobilization, V and VI would hardly be ready for a battle; they would have to retire behind the Oder.

Even if V and VI fought and lost a battle on the Lohe, the Austrian pursuit would come to a standstill about April 30th at Glogau.

II. (*Translation.*)

"Assuming that we have placed:—

9th	Division at Görlitz ...	...	10,000
11th	„ „ Freiburg	...	13,000
12th	„ „ Frankenstein	...	10,000

and that general mobilization is ordered at the same time in Vienna and Berlin.

"(A) The Austrians take the offensive. Politically and morally advantageous for us, but at first militarily disadvantageous for us.

"(*a*) They invade Silesia by Landeshut with 50,000 men.

"Impracticable to unite our two divisions in front of the Oder.

"9th Division remains at Görlitz to cover the concentration of I, II, and III.

"11th Division resists the Austrians.

"12th Division reinforces the fortresses, then both retire to Breslau.

"10th Division also to Breslau, making altogether 40,000 men; either battle at Breslau or defensive behind the Oder.

"On 18th day, 18,000 Austrians can be concentrated in Austrian Silesia, invest Cosel and Neisse and observe Glatz. In the same time eight trains along the line through Olmütz, put down 60,000 men at Theresienstadt or Josephstadt, reaching Breslau on the 25th day, making there then 110,000 Austrians.

"On 26th we have at Görlitz I, II, III, and 9th Division, about 100,000 men, marching upon Liegnitz, joined by 40,000 from Breslau through Leubus.

"Battle with 140,000 men while 120,000 men are marching from Torgau through Dresden to Bohemia, where by the 31st day the Austrians can have 20,000 men.

"This operation therefore sacrifices Saxony.

"(*b*) They leave 25,000 men in observation at Nachod and Trautenau, advance with 26,000 men to Löbau, and unite with 24,000 Saxons.

"This operation has, properly speaking, no objective.

"The shorter way to Breslau is by Landeshut, to Berlin by Dresden.

"Doubtful whether the Saxons will march off to Bautzen if our forces at Torgau are threatening Dresden.

"In from five to eight days the Austrians might have pushed back our 9th Division beyond Kohlfurt, and on the 20th day have 50,000 men at that point. This would compel us to place the deployment of I, II, and III further back at Sorau, Guben, or Frankfurt; but the further they advance in this direction the worse will be their suitation—their reinforcements will be unable to reach them at all.

"9th Division retires to Bunzlau, 10th Division goes *viâ* Breslau to Freiburg, V and VI take the offensive through Trautenau on the 25th day with from 40,000 to 58,000 men.

"By this time 18,000 Austrians from Galicia might have invested the fortresses, and 50,000 or 60,000 from Hungary may be at Josephstadt.

"In that case V and VI must maintain the defensive in Silesia.

"But at the same time 99,000 men advance upon Görlitz, having 50,000 Austro-Saxons before them, and 127,000 men advance upon Dresden, where there is nothing before them.

"Assuming that the Austro-Saxon corps retires in time that the Galician corps does not invest fortresses, but marches by road to Josephstadt, there would be on the 31st day 25,000 + 18,000 = 43,000 Austrians at Nachod and Trautenau against 58,000 Prussians—50,000 and 80,000, together 130,000 Austro-Saxons in Northern Bohemia, against 127,000 and 99,000, together 226,000 Prussians.

"(*c*) The Austrians leave 25,000 men at Nachod and Trautenau, and unite on the 14th day with 24,000 Saxons at Dresden, together about 50,000 men, which move on the left bank of the Elbe and reach Torgau about the 18th day. We should stop our transports at Magdeburg. Even if we concentrated IV, VII, and VIII behind the Saale or the Mulde, the Austro-Saxon Army, with these three corps on their flank and between our fortresses, would never venture to cross the Elbe. The Guard would have to go to Wittenberg.

"If the Austrians advance on the right bank of the Elbe, they cannot prevent our concentration at Torgau, nor advance past Torgau towards Berlin; the army at Görlitz would advance into Bohemia, preventing the Austrian retreat from Torgau, or would take the offensive in combination with the Silesian Army, 99,000 + 59,000 = 158,000, against 25,000 + 60,000 = 85,000 Austrians.

"(B) The Austrians await our attack. In this case we must not fear the reproach of aggression, but must advance to the attack so soon as the deployment of the army is finished.

"(*a*) The Austrians advance into Saxony. If our advance guard has secured the bridges at Riesa and Meissen, we advance on both banks, as we shall be stronger upon each than the enemy, who will have had to leave behind corps of observation at Josephstadt and Trübau.

"Circumstances must decide whether we shall then attack the enemy from both sides, or shall advance from Meissen on the right bank as far as Kamnitz-Tetschen, manœuvre the enemy out of Saxony, reach Prague before or at the same time with him, keep him on the left bank of the Moldau, and drive him back to Lintz. We should occupy Saxony with Landwehr.

"The army from Görlitz marches *viâ* Reichenberg, and unites at Königgrätz with the Silesian Army, 150,000 men, about the 31st day, when the enemy cannot be stronger than 60,000 + 25,000 = 85,000.

"If the enemy, as he probably would, retires to Olmütz and there is reinforced until he is 150,000, we shall still be with far superior forces on the inner line of operations between the two armies of the enemy, and the road by Iglau to Vienna will be open to us. It is a question whether our advance to Iglau will compel the enemy's principal army to advance out of its entrenched camp and accept battle in the open, with its rear towards Hungary. If we raid as far as Lundenburg, the impossibility of supplying themselves will compel them to take this course.

	Men.
(*b*) The Austrians remain in Northern Bohemia	50,000
Are joined by the Saxons	24,000
And reinforced by the 28th by	97,000
Total	171,000
Also at Olmütz or Pardubitz	18,000
	189,000

"Our effort will be to force a battle before the 31st day. For that purpose we must bring up the army from Torgau to Dresden as quick as possible, and seize the railway by pushing on the division or brigade first ready. From Dresden and Görlitz concentric advance of 225,000 men towards Jung-Bunzlau.

"If Austrian main army is at Prague, battle, if possible, fronting towards the west; 50,000 men *viâ* Trautenau towards Pardubitz.

"If the whole enemy's force stands at Pardubitz, simultaneous attack by all three armies.

"(*c*) The Austrians confine themselves to observing Northern Bohemia, retire in front of superior forces upon Olmütz, where on the 31st day they will have 50,000 + 80,000 + 18,000 = 148,000. (The Saxons will hardly go with them.)

"This concentration we cannot prevent, and as we can hardly reach Olmütz with our principal force before the 45th day, the Austrians may by that time have 248,000 men; but if they choose this plan they give up all Bohemia, which is not very probable.

"The advantage in regard to numbers which we should have under all the other assumptions rests entirely upon gaining time."

No. 39. (*Translation.*)

April 9th and 10th.

Presumes Simultaneous Mobilization.

Points of Prussian concentration:—

IV, VII, VIII	Halle.
Guard	Berlin.
I, II, III	Görlitz.
V, VI	In Silesia.

Austrian Offensive.

"(*a*) Against Berlin:—

"Giving the Austrians five or six days for calling in reservists in the Border Province, and two or three days for transport, the forces now in Bohemia will on the ninth day be ... ... 53,000 men.

Deduct for communications	17,000	,,
Leaves	36,000	,,
Joining on the 11th day, the Saxons ...	24,000	,,
Forming between Dresden and Bautzen	60,000	,,

"If two brigades are enough to cover the march against Torgau and Wittenberg, this force can place 45,000 men—

On the 15th day at Torgau.
On the 18th day at Jüterbog.
On the 21st day at Berlin.

"On the 24th day 53,000 further troops could have reached Bohemia.

"On the 24th day our V and VI can be concentrated in Silesia.

The Austrians would have against Silesia ...	17,000
Together with, out of Galicia	18,000
And of the reinforcements from Austria ...	13,000
must join them, making	48,000

"Thus in Silesia their 48,000 will face our two corps, less garrisons, equal 50,000, leaving 40,000 Austrian reinforcements to move on to Dresden or Löbau.

"On the same (24th) day I, II, and III, about 99,000 men, will be at Görlitz.

"The Austro-Saxon force must turn back not later than the 18th day at Jüterbog in order to get back to Bautzen on the 24th, in which case the forces facing each other would be equal both in Silesia (48,000 Austrians, 50,000 Prussians) and in Lusatia (100,000 Austrians, 99,000 Prussians). But in this the Prussian IV, VII, VIII, and Guard are not counted, and, taking them into the account, it is clear that a move on Berlin would be fatal to the Austrians.

"The Saxons will hardly go to Berlin while the Prussians threaten Leipzig, and can scarcely be ready on the 13th day.

"We must consider the means of protecting Berlin without changing our general plan of concentration.

"Probably an Austrian offensive would aim at something less—at disturbing our concentration.

"An Austrian advance on the right bank of the Elbe cannot disturb the concentration at Torgau.

"(*b*) Against Leipzig or Torgau:—

"On the left bank of the Elbe, leaving behind 10,000 Saxons, the Austrians could get 50,000 men to Halle, Weissenfeld, and Bitterfeld on the 19th or 20th day.

"But this they will hardly do, for if they turn back at once they could hardly reach Löbau by the 24th day.

"But by pushing forward on the left bank, they might

reach the neighbourhood of Torgau on the 14th or 15th day and disturb our movements of troops from the west; this proves that Torgau is not a safe point for our concentration.

N.B.—To work out how IV and VII might occupy Leipzig, in order to cover debarkation of troops at Weissenfeld, Halle, and Bitterfeld:—

"The Austrians, with 60,000 men at Dresden, Meissen, or Riesa, will make it hard for our three corps to unite with the Guard, and for them to get on to the right bank of the Elbe.

"We might send the guard by Wittenberg to Leipzig, but as its mobilization is slow, should lose time in doing so. Better plan for the three corps to move on Dresden, pushing on an advance guard as soon as ready and moving by Grimm–Colditz, so as to be on the line Nossen–Freiburg about the 28th, sending a detachment to secure the bridge at Riesa.

"Send an advance guard of the Guard to Jüterbog on the 17th to cover Berlin against possible insult, and to advance, if not opposed, to the Elster; send on after it the rest of the Guard as ready, which would give 20,000 men at Mühlberg on the 26th day; this could reach Nossen in two marches.

"If the Austrians risk a battle for the defence of Saxony, the only point where they could fight is Dresden, with their line of retreat through the Erzgebirge. Even if they bring up for it all the reinforcements that have come up they could not have more than 60,000 + 53,000 = 113,000 men, the same strength as ours, which is 93,000 + 20,000.

"In that case our V and VI = 50,000 men, would be opposed only by 17,000 + 18,000 = 35,000, our army at Görlitz would have no one against it, and would be at Tetschen and Aussig on the day of the battle.

"It is thus probable that there will be no battle in Saxony, and that on the approach of our three corps the enemy will withdraw into Bohemia.

"If the Austrians retire on the left bank they must leave Dresden on the 26th, or they will be caught by our three corps at Aussig. Bnt on the left bank the retreat must be continued to Prague, because our Görlitz army will prevent their crossing of the Elbe before that. The Austrians would therefore probably retreat upon the right bank, and the Guards, advancing by Grossenheim, would open the passages of the Elbe in Saxony for us.

"But our army at Görlitz threatens a retreat even on the

right bank of the Elbe, and it must, therefore, begin before our Görlitz army is ready. Thus, for operations against Berlin, Torgau, or Leipzig, the Austrians have only the half interval between the 12th and the 24th, that is, six days = five marches to the front.

"(*c*) Against Görlitz:—

"Our army at Görlitz prevents the Austrians trying (*a*) or (*b*), how if they attack this army, leaving 10,000 Saxons at Dresden? They can put 50,000 men on the 11th day at Löbau, which can reach—

On the 13th day Köhlfurt;
On the 16th day Sagan-Sorau;
On the 21st day Frankfurt.

"This advance might be pushed to Sorau without endangering its retreat, and therefore Halbau is the point where the first parties of I, II, and III should debark in order to continue towards Görlitz, by road; later bodies could be debarked at Köhlfurt or Görlitz, or further in rear, according to circumstances.

"So far the general result is that by the 24th day Austria and Saxony cannot put into action more than 148,000 men, while by the same date we can assemble twice that force.

"Of the 148,000 not more 100,000 can safely pass north of the Bohemian border without endangering the communications Prague-Olmütz.

"Of this 100,000, 50,000 are available from the 12th day (say 14, because of Saxony), and can then be increased by 4,000 a day.

"If this body of 50,000 men, plus extras, advances in one solid body, it will, till the 24th day, be stronger than what we shall have assembled at any one point.

"At any one point, then, our concentration may be disturbed, but meanwhile it will come on smoothly at the other points.

"By the 33rd day the Austrians can have 38,000 more, making altogether 148,000 + 38,000 = 186,000, but of these they must use 56,000 against Silesia.

"With the remaining 130,000 Saxony cannot be defended against an army of 127,000 and another army of 99,000, together 226,000.

"Saxony must in any case be evacuated, and as we can be on the 33rd day at Prague, starting either from Görlitz or from Leipzig, the Austrian retreat from Dresden cannot be postponed beyond the 24th day.

"If Austria wants Saxony's alliance she will be expected to defend Saxony.

"But if the Austrians go forward to Dresden or beyond, we get an early decisive battle, and after the 24th day a battle in which the Austrian retreat is compromised. If the Austrians retreat in time it is doubtful whether the Saxons will go with them, and if not, they lose 24,000 men.

"Our concentration must be so arranged that we can, until the 24th, evade a blow made at any of the points.

"(*d*) Against Breslau:—

"The Austrians concentrate between Josephstadt and Trautenau, invest Glatz with 8,000 men, and appear on the 14th or 15th day with 45,000 men before Breslau; V and VI can unite only at Breslau, and will have on the 15th day 38,000 men, on the 18th 48,000 men.

"Doubtful whether they could risk a battle on the Lohe. Here is the point where we must make up our minds in time to get a few days' start of the Austrians in armament.

"On the 18th day the Austrians will have 18,000 men from Galicia, who, however, will have to march by road from Oderberg or Oswiecim; they can reach the Neisse by the 24th day, but will be absorbed in the investment of Cosel and Neisse.

"In any case, on the 24th day the Austrian offensive, with 45,000 men, would come to a standstill before Glogau. By the 24th day the Austrians have got 53,000 fresh troops in Bohemia. Suppose they send them straight on to Dresden, there would be there 44,000 + 33,000 = 77,000, which could not maintain themselves against 125,000 men advancing from Leipzig and Riesa. The reinforcements might, however, be sent to Silesia in detachments; in that case there would be 45,000 + 53,000 = 98,000 at Liegnitz on the 28th day, and they would have five Prussians corps against them.

"I, II, and III would have advanced from Köhlfurt or Sagan to the Queiss or Bober to join hands with V and VI, which would come up from Glogau.

"Meanwhile our first army would be approaching Tetschen.

"In this case, supposing the Saxons stand by the Austrians, our 125,000 men would drive before them the 24,000 Saxons on 30th day at Kamnitz, would push back the reinforcements, 38,000 (with the Saxons making 62,000), and would reach Josephstadt on the 35th day. As we should be superior, both in Silesia and in Bohemia, the two Austrian armies would have to retire to Olmütz, and this retreat could

hardly be carried out without a decisive battle. Thus any offensive of Austria brings about in the long run a situation strategically favourable to us, because it makes it possible for us to bring all our forces into action before Austria can bring up all hers.

"Yet even a temporary invasion of Silesia, a partial disturbance of our mobilization there, requisitions made upon Breslau, or the possible loss of one of our fortresses, would be serious calamities. But to prevent them, on the assumption of simultaneous general mobilization after the Austrians have already collected an army in Bohemia, is impossible, if we keep to the originally proposed first disposition of our forces, which was based on the assumption that we should take the initiative."

No. 40. (*Précis.*)

April 12th.

The part of Prussia most directly threatened is Silesia. The Austrians can have 19,000 men from Galicia ready to cross the frontier on the 22nd day, and 18,000 from Pardubitz which can be ready on the 24th, and reach Neisse on the 27th.

At Trautenau and Friedland they already have forces which can reach Breslau in seven days, or in six if they should concentrate at Trautenau.

This attack on Breslau would be, at least in the first instance, the most effective move for Austria.

Very desirable to cover our mobilization in Silesia against it by placing troops near the frontier, and in any case collecting in front of Breslau a force sufficient to protect the town.

If we deduct the garrisons of Josephstadt and Theresienstadt, the Austrians could employ on this line 37,000 men.

We have at least that many troops in Silesia, but both sides before acting would have to call in reserves. The Austrians would have to call them up to troops already concentrated, while we should first fill up our troops and then concentrate; neither process is much quicker than the other.

The VI Corps, which is nearest and can be ready first, should be placed, not at Neisse but in front of Schweidnitz. The corps could on the 11th day have its advance guard at Landeshut, reinforcing it on the 17th with 22,000 men, to which would be added of the V Corps 20,000 men, giving

42,000 to resist the enemy's advance. The Austrians must leave 7,000 men to invest Glatz, which has a garrison of that strength, and would have 30,000 men for their advance. If they started on the 10th day they would drive back our advance guard from Schweidnitz on the 12th, but if it resisted could hardly reach Breslau before the 15th, where on the 15th our two corps would have 30,000 men, increased on the 18th to 40,000.

If we can delay the Austrians till the 17th between Schweidnitz and the hills, we shall, by the 22nd, have of V and VI 52,000, and of I 17,500, altogether about 70,000, at Landeshut.

By the 22nd the Austrians will have received reinforcements of 38,000; if they sent them all by Josephstadt they will have 30,000 + 38,000 = 68,000, against our 70,000.

At the same time they will have 7,000 men at Glatz and 19,000 + 18,000 = 37,000 in Upper Silesia.

The Austrians might send part of their reinforcements to Saxony, but the situation there would be so unfavourable to them that we may dismiss this hypothesis.

Accordingly, on the 30th day, there will be—

Saxons	24,000
Austrians, 37,000 + 18,000 + 19,000 + 38,000 + 40,000 = ...	152,000
	176,000

We should have approaching Dresden IV, VII, VIII—93,000 against 24,000 Saxons; at Turnau, III and II—65,000; between Breslau and Josephstadt, V, VI, and I—93,000, making, with III and II, 158,000.

In these totals our Guard Corps is not reckoned; it mobilizes so late that it ought to be sent to the point where forces are most needed.

Suppose the Austrians attack Silesia, our right wing is evidently too strong; it comes latest into action, and cannot reach Josephstadt or Pardubitz before the 40th day.

It is our left wing that wants reinforcing; the best use of the Guard would be to move it direct to Frankenstein, whence it could move on the enemy's flank or rear, but as the II Corps is using the line Frankfurt–Köhlfurt until the 31st day, the Guard could not reach Glatz until after the 40th day.

The only thing to do with the Guard is, therefore, to send it by the Dresden line to join IV, VII and VIII at

Dresden by the 30th; III will have 23,000 men at Görlitz on the 14th day and will protect the railway behind it. Between the 22nd and 31st day the II Corps will be passing Köhlfurt, and as on the 22nd V, VI, and a part of I will already be as Landeshut, II might be sent straight on to Hirschberg. This would bring the Silesian Army V, VI, I, and II up to a strength of 130,000 men by the 30th.

No doubt the Austrians might attack Görlitz in force enough to drive back the III Corps, but this would weaken the Austrians in Bohemia and would lead to a disaster for the force engaged. Nor can the enemy undertake with any prospect of success an advance towards Leipzig or Berlin.

It would, perhaps, be better to send IV at the beginning to Herzberg–Torgau, which it could reach as soon as Delitsch. This Corps, ready on the 26th, would be at Dresden on the 28th. The Guard would have the railway free from the 22nd, and Guard and IV would be on the 30th between Dresden and Schandau.

If we leave VII and VIII out of the account we should then have on the 30th day—

IV and Guard at Schandau	65,000
III at Zittau...	34,000
V, VI, I, II Trautenau	127,000
	226,000
Against—	
127,000 + 24,000 in Bohemia	151,000
And in Upper Silesia	19,000
	170,000

This favourable situation cannot change before the 45th day, when Austria, together with the Saxons, may be 238,000 men strong, if circumstances are favourable.

Following disposition to be considered :—

IV and Guard at Herzberg.
III at Görlitz.
II at Hirschberg.
VI Schweidnitz.
V and I Breslau.
Possibly VII and VIII Halle.

No. 41. (*Précis.*)

April 13th.

Note on the troops in Silesia.

No. 42. (*Translation.*)

April 14th.

To the King.

"For the first deployment of the army the following points of concentration are proposed:—

Date.	Corps.	Place.
20th to 24th day	IV and Guard ...	Herzberg, Calau, or Sonnenwalde.
12th to 19th day	III	Görlitz.
20th to 29th day	I	Liegnitz or Greiffenberg.
12th to 24th day	V	Schweidnitz.
21st to 27th day	II	Breslau or Neisse.
	VI, 11th Division	Landeshut.
	12th Division	Neisse.

"The reasons which determine this proposal are: to move the troops as quick as possible by using every available railway and to be as strong as possible in Silesia upon the shortest road for attacking the enemy.

"The 11th Division being first ready, and nearest, must occupy the defile most threatened so as to cover the mobilization and concentration in Silesia; whether it must then rejoin the 12th depends on circumstances; in that case the VI Corps would independently bear the defence of Upper Silesia. The III Corps also protects the railway lines.

"When the deployment is completed, III, I, and V would cross the mountains by the routes Görlitz–Zittau, Greiffenberg–Friedland, Landeshut–Trautenau, and take the offensive into Bohemia, II and VI co-operating according to circumstances.

"The right wing is proportionately weaker, two army corps, because on account of Saxony it has to assemble at a greater distance from Bohemia, which it can only reach later, and because it cannot possibly meet with strong resistance.

"VII and VIII are not included because the political situation does not yet reveal whether they will have to be

sent to the Main or can be brought up by railway through Hanover and Cassel. Both plans have been considered.

"As the Austrians have already an army in Bohemia, and the Saxons can assemble at Dresden in a short time, they might, if they advance together, at first cause some disturbances in our mobilization.

"But the force with which they can do this at first is insufficient for a war against Prussia, the means requisite for that have to be brought up from Austria, from Hungary, and from a further distance by one single railway, so long at least as Bavaria does not allow Austria to use the line Regensburg–Pilsen. We have five railways to use. If, therefore, both sides arm simultaneously there must come a period when we shall have the numerical superiority, and this is the period which we must use with all speed and energy to bring about great decisive battles. This period will come more quickly and surely if the Austrians advance into Saxony or into our territory. If they remain on the defensive and begin by collecting all their forces, say at Pardubitz or Olmütz, giving up Saxony and a large part of Bohemia, the numerical proportions will be equal, or, in case we bring up only seven corps and the Austrians bring up all their possible forces, will be unfavourable to us.

"If the Austrians arrange to fill up the cadres now in Bohemia by merely sending on reservists, then deducting their four battalions as garrisons for Josephstadt, Theresienstadt, and Prague, the development of their forces will be as follows:—

11th day	in Bohemia	36,000
14th „	at Dresden	24,000
25th „	from Austria	39,000
25th „	„ Galicia	19,000
28th „	„ Moravia	18,000
33rd „	„ Hungary	46,000
45th „	„ distant provinces ...	55,000
	Austro-Saxon total	240,000

"Our seven army corps would have:—

25th day	... ... 200,000, against	118,000
32nd „	... ... 223,000, „	182,000

"From the 25th to the 40th day we can count on superior numbers even without VII and VIII. The value of these 14 days may be estimated if we consider that every second

day brings the Austrians a whole brigade, with cavalry, artillery and trains.

"The question whether we shall in fact be the stronger at the decisive point I could answer only by considering the possible and probable undertakings of the enemy, and this will be the best test of the correctness of the dispositions proposed.

"It is therefore necessary closely to examine all that the enemy can undertake on the offensive and on the defensive.

"An Austrian offensive on the left bank of the Elbe is too unfavourable to be considered; it compels them to force the passage of the Elbe between our fortresses and in our teeth, and to risk their most important communications.

"On the right bank of the Elbe their offensive might be directed against Berlin. It cannot be attempted without covering the railway at Pardubitz–Trübau with 10,000 men; the Austrians could then, on the 14th day, unite 26,000 of their own troops with 24,000 Saxons, making 50,000 men at Dresden. Considering time only, they might be at Berlin on the 24th. But this advance would have to pass Torgau and Wittenberg, ond on the 20th day there would be 20,000 men of IV at Torgau. The Austrian force would therefore have to weaken itself by very considerable detachments, and would meet the Guard Corps almost complete between Calau and Berlin.

"An advance of this kind, in case our armaments were delayed, might for the time be disagreeable, but would very soon be to the decided disadvantage of the enemy. For on the day when he would reach Berlin we should have 30,000 men at Görlitz, 50,000 at Landeshut, and should take the offensive into Bohemia against the Austrian 10,000 left to guard the railways and 39,000 reinforcements, making 49,000, with not less than 80,000 men. The reinforcements from Galicia would only have reached Pardubitz, and the Austrian Army from Berlin could not get back to Bohemia before the 36th day. To be in time for the decisive battle in Bohemia it would have to turn back at Herzberg.

"An Austrian offensive against Görlitz is improbable, for it would have no objective. 30,000 Austrians might be brought to Löbau in three days, and then march in two days to Kohlfurt. But on the 14th day III would have 20,000 men, and on the 21st day 30,000 men, at Görlitz. If compelled to retire it would find I behind it debarking its troops further back. The further the enemy carried this advance the worse would be his situation in Bohemia.

"The most natural offensive which promises the best

results at the beginning is the invasion of Silesia. For this purpose the Austrians, after investing Glatz, could use all their other troops, for the advance covers their communications. If they first concentrated between Josephstadt and Trautenau they might have 28,000 men at Breslau in six days.

"We can have an advance guard at the defile of Liebau on the 10th day. Behind that would be, on the 16th day, the 11th Division, 15,000 men, at Landeshut, with 8,000 men of V behind it at Breslau.

"If the Austrians made an earlier start we should be ready on the 20th day to fight them with sufficient forces at Breslau.

"However they might succeed at the beginning, by the 21st day V and 11th Division will be strong enough to drive them back.

"By the 25th day the Austrians might have 67,000 men between Josephstadt and Breslau; we should have on the same line 46,000, at Görlitz–Greiffenberg III and part of I, making 46,000 men; the enemy, therefore, would retreat, abandon his investment of Glatz, and concentrate, say by the 25th day, 77,000 men at Josephstadt.

"From here the Austrians would be able throw themselves in superior force either against our corps advancing from Liebau or against the army from Görlitz advancing by Reichenberg.

"Our Reichenberg force would find its nearest support in IV and Guard, which, on the 28th day, might be at Dresden–Bischofswerda.

"Supposing that IV has to be left in Saxony, still the Guard could, on the 30th day, join hands with III and I at Haida, and on the 32nd day we should have on the line Jung–Bunzlau–Turnau Guard III and I, 96,000, at Liebau V and 11th Division, or possibly, a division of II, 46,000, making 142,000 men.

"If the Austrians accept battle on the Iser to protect Prague they might collect at Münchengrätz 95,000 men, in which are not counted the Galician corps, which could not be up, nor the Bohemian army, which would be held fast at Trautenau.

"We should, therefore, have 96,000, against 95,000.

"Our advance frem Trautenau will probably compel the Austrians to retreat. On the 36th day we should reach the line Pardubitz–Königgrätz with Guard III and I, 96,000; having left 11th division before Josephstadt we should bring up on to our left wing V by Trautenau, and VI by Nachod, 65,000, giving us 161,000 men; on this day, the

36th, the Austrians might have assembled on the Upper Elbe 158,000 men; thus, if they brought up everything, we should fight with equal forces.

"This is supposing we leave the IV Corps in Saxony and the 12th Division in Upper Silesia.

"The result is that we should have a considerable superiority if we can bring only the VII Army Corps on to the Elbe, and, further, that it is of the greatest importance to bring our right wing corps, the Guard, as quickly forward as possible, as the advance of the whole line depends upon it, for our left wing is opposed by the enemy's principal force, and the right wing must disengage it before it can come out from the mountains.

"Suppose the Austrians keep on the defensive. If they assemble between Olmütz and Pardubitz they would have, on the 36th day, the same forces as have just been reckoned, although this involves the sacrifice of Saxony and Northern Bohemia.

"The most probable case is that the Austrians will collect their army on the line Pardubitz–Prague. They have now two advanced detachments at Theresienstadt and Josephstadt. The first of 20,000 will unite with 24,000 Saxons at Dresden, the other 16,000 will watch the frontier from Reichenberg to Josephstadt.

"By the 33rd day the Austrians can collect in the area Prague–Jung-Bunzlau–Kolin from Austria and Hungary 85,000 between Pardubitz and Trübau, from Moravia 18,000, between Oswiecim and Oderberg, from Galicia 19,000.

"We shall have IV and Guard near Herzberg, 60,000 men, ready to invade Saxony on the 24th and at Dresden–Bischofswerda on the 27th.

"Before that date we shall have V and 11th Division, 46,000 men, at Liebau.

"By this time the Austrians can send their reinforcements from Austria, 39,000, by railway direct either to Dresden or to Josephstadt, or they may divide them.

"If they send them to Dresden that gives 44,000 + 39,000 = 83,000, against our 60,000; we shall in that case not advance there, but we might bring up III, which could arrive on the 25th. But V, half of VI, and III, 77,000, would have against them in Bohemia only 16,000, and possibly the Moravian reinforcements, 18,000. They would, therefore, seriously threaten a retreat of the Austrian Army at Dresden.

"If they sent them to Josephstadt they would have 16,000 + 40,000 + 18,000 = 74,000, against 46,000, and

would prevent the invasion of Bohemia, but, meanwhile, the Dresden Army would have only 44,000, against our 60,000, and would have to evacuate Saxony probably by the left bank of the Elbe in consequence of the pressure of III, followed by I. In case they divide their reinforcements, they would have at Dresden 44,000 + 20,000 = 64,000, against 60,000, which in a few days would be 65,000, and they would have near Josephstadt altogether 53,000, against 90,000; we should then advance our left wing for battle in Bohemia, trying to keep the enemy's left wing at Dresden.

"Reviewing the three cases, the first is too unfavourable for Austria to be probable, the third is also unfavourable for them, their best course would be to keep their reinforcements between Josephstadt and Turnau, and to bring back their army from Dresden into Bohemia by the right bank of the Elbe.

"We will suppose the Saxons go back with them; if they delay retreating till the 25th day our III will endanger their retreat.

"With luck they might have on the 30th day at Niemes 44,000 men, against IV and Guard 65,000; at Reichenberg 39,000, against III and I 62,000; at Josephstadt 34,000, against 45,000; at Jung-Bunzlan 30,000 in reserve—altogether 147,000, against our 172,000.

"As we are superior at every point during the first period we shall seek battle at every point.

"With good leading the Austrians might collect on the 35th day behind the Iser at Königgrätz and Pardubitz 129,000 men, against our 127,000; at Josephstadt 34,000, against our 45,000. This is the point when we should seek a decisive battle. If the Austrians will and can avoid it they cannot oppose us with superior force until they reach Olmütz.

"On the whole, even if the Austrians take the defensive, the numbers are not unfavourable to us even on the supposition that we bring up only seven army corps.

"But once we mobilize we must not care for the reproach of aggression. For delay makes our position decidedly worse."

No. 43. (*Précis.*)

To Colonel von Döring, Chief of Department in the General Staff.

April 14th.

Instructions for assembling and conduct of the 12th Division in Silesia.

No. 44. (*Translation.*)

Reasons of the First Dispositions.

April 20th.

VIII.	Zeitz		I.
VII.	Halle		127,000 men.
IV.	Herzberg		
Guard.	Spremberg		
III.	Görlitz		II.
I.	Greiffenberg		65,000 men.
V.	—	Schweidnitz	III.
VI.	11th Division	Schweidnitz	93,000 men.
	12th „	Neisse ...	
II.	Frankenstein		

"The seven Prussian Army Corps assemble themselves on the line from Herzberg to Neisse, which is 187 miles long. This disposition would be bad if the Austrians could at once assemble anything like an equal force in Bohemia. But on the 14th day there can be in Saxony and Bohemia only about 60,000 men, a force which no doubt at the beginning would cause us some disturbance. But that cannot be prevented during the first period even if we choose any other more concentrated disposition, unless we choose our point behind the Spree and the Oder. Our deployment will be completed by the 25th day, by which day the enemy cannot have more than 100,000 men in Bohemia. He, therefore, cannot prevent our transferring to Bohemia the point of concentration for 200,000 men.

"The points to be considered in the first deployment under the given circumstances are—

"The necessity for protecting Berlin and Breslau at the beginning, of having the strongest possible force in Silesia, and the attainment of the greatest possible speed of concentration by using every existing railway.

"Any other disposition than that proposed would, in my opinion, inadequately meet one or the other of these requirements.

"Our right wing is furthest from Bohemia. It is not practicable to bring it nearer. It must, therefore, be kept weak enough, but also strong enough to protect Berlin; for this reason I put only two corps in Lusatia, five in Silesia. For if our principal force advanced from Lusatia it would drive the Austrians towards Olmütz and towards their reinforcements, whereas our advance from Silesia drives them back across the Elbe and cuts them off from their main communications with Austria and Hungary.

"It is desirable to be as strong as possible in Silesia, partly for above reason and partly because our left wing has the enemy directly in front of it, and because he for that reason will probably direct against Silesia his first arriving reinforcements.

"Already there is an Austrian division at Josephstadt, only 70 miles from Breslau. It, therefore, seems correct to concentrate the Silesian Army in the neighbourhood of Landeshut and Schweidnitz. But more than three divisions cannot at first be brought up by the railways, and the issue from the mountains may be delayed. For this reason this army is in the first instance distributed from Greiffenberg and Hirschbreg to Landeshut in order to make use of every pass through the mountains, and to be able to disengage the passes by an advance from Lusatia.

"For this purpose our III Corps at Görlitz is available. But it may be necessary to draw that corps to a decisive battle at Dresden, which it can reach at the same time as the Guard and IV. Therefore III is at first assigned neither to the First nor to the Second Army, but is under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, who alone can see whether it will be more needed at Trautenau or at Dresden.

"It would have been desirable to assemble the whole of VI immediately at Neisse, and to trust to it the independent defence of Upper Silesia. But the 11th Division is at the first moment indispensably required at Schweidnitz, where no other can replace it, for any other would come too late to prevent the Austrians now assembled at Josephstadt from reaching Breslau in five marches.

"Lastly, the II Corps with its late mobilization is given to neither of the two armies but regarded as a reserve for Silesia. It has a double-track railway free to Breslau or Brieg, and can either relieve the 11th Division or reinforce the Silesian Army at Schweidnitz, or conduct from the county of Glatz an effective diversion against the rear of the enemy's position, Josephstadt–Koniggrätz, or against his main line of communications, Pardubitz–Trübau. The Silesian Army as soon as it is assembled can cross the border of Bohemia; the Lusatian Army is still five marches distant from that border. It is therefore important to have IV and Guard ready as soon as possible.

"The disposition proposed leaves clear the left bank of the Elbe. An operation of the enemy in this direction is too unfavourable for him to be likely.

"An advance of 50,000 men against Berlin can only cause

us temporary inconvenience. The Guard would draw back to Berlin its advanced parties, IV finds protection behind the Elbe at Torgau, and as soon as it is strong enough advances against the communications of the enemy, while the Silesian Army, which in that case can meet no serious resistance in Bohemia concentrates itself in rear of the enemy. The same measures would suffice against an offensive of the Austro-Saxons against Görlitz.

"It is clear that any advance of the Austrians at the beginning beyond the Saxon border, or even an advance into Saxony must lead to a result favourable for us, as it brings our right wing earlier into action, draws the enemy away from his reinforcements, and leaves them alone opposite the Silesian Army.

"More disagreeable for us is an Austrian offensive into Silesia. Whether we can collect in front of Breslau a sufficient force depends upon the degree of readiness which the Bohemian Corps will have attained when the war begins. But this operation leaves Saxony defenceless and gives our right wing time to come up to the Bohemian frontier. In any case an invasion of Central Silesia can only be temporary, and it can hardly be supposed that Saxony will take an active part in the war if left without any assistance by Austria.

"The most probable thing is that Austria will remain on the defensive, in order, first of all, to concentrate its principal forces in Bohemia and on the border of Upper Silesia. The Bohemian Corps already has two divisions as advance guards at Josephstadt and Theresienstadt, the latter ready to unite with the Saxons at Dresden.

"About the time when our corps will be ready on the frontier, the Austrians in Saxony and Northern Bohemia can have assembled on the line Prague–Pardubitz and in front of it only 100,000 men and on the border of Upper Silesia only 40,000 men. It has been proved that we shall then for two or three weeks have a decided numerical superiority, and it follows that we must not lose this precious time by waiting, must not shun the reproach of aggression, must not delay in our operations once our forces are assembled, and, therefore, that the order to mobilize and the determination to have war must come together.

"This step will be taken for political reasons, but from the military point of view mobilization is required not merely the moment Austria expresses herself, but so soon as any additional cadres are 'stationed' in Bohemia because otherwise the concentration of our armies towards their front will become dubious and even the defensive defective.

"Partial postings of isolated corps can now no longer help, because without doubt Austria would immediately reply by transport to Bohemia, and in response to this we should immediately have to call up our whole force. As the situation stands, any further considerable arming on either one side or the other must inevitably lead to war.

"For this reason there can be no objection to, and in consideration of Mainz, Holstein, and Saxony there is every necessity for, declaring war the moment mobilization is ordered.

"Lastly, as regards VII and VIII, these corps can be concentrated in about the same time at Mainz–Frankfort as at Halle–Zeitz, and in either case are about the same distance from Munich, but in the latter case are within reach for co-operation towards Bohemia. From the Saale they can reach Dresden in six days, Prague in 14, while from the Main they require a 30 days' march. These two corps ensure us the superiority in Bohemia even after the 45th day, and it is therefore from a military point of view most advisable to bring them up.

"The essential point is to overthrow the one enemy, Austria, in order to remove any other resistance in Germany. The first battles in Bohemia will probably be fought before Bavaria can put in the field an army of 40,000 men, and a great superiority in these battles will probably decide the issue of the war."

[Table of Austrian forces follows.]

No. 45. (*Translation.*)

April 27th.

Notes for Verbal Report to the King.

"Austria and Saxony in 14 days could concentrate on our frontier 60,000 men, which we cannot in the same time oppose with an equal force.

"But on the 25th day the deployment of 200,000 men on our side will be ended, and as by then Austria can have only 100,000 men in Bohemia we shall transfer to the front the point of concentration for our corps, and on the 33rd day have the First and Second armies in Bohemia and have occupied Saxony with the VIII Corps.

"The dispositions proposed aim at—

"(1) The quickest possible assembling of our corps by using all the through lines and the protection of Berlin and Breslau at the beginning.

"(2) To have the strongest possible force in Silesia, because from here we can reach the enemy more surely and quicker than from Lusatia, and because an advance from Lusatia would drive the enemy back upon his reinforcements, while from Silesia it cuts him off from them; and, lastly, because from Landeshut and Glatz we can take in rear his strongest position, Königgrätz–Josephstadt.

"If the Austrians defend Saxony or Northern Bohemia, and for this purpose direct an important portion of their reserves in that direction, our Silesian Army will be superior to any force at Königgrätz–Josephstadt. It will then at once take the offensive down the left bank of the Upper Elbe towards Pardubitz.

"If the Austrians direct their main reinforcements to Josephstadt the Silesian Army will confine itself to defending the mountain chain until disengaged by the advance of the first army.

"By our assembling four corps on the line Mühlberg–Spremberg, Berlin is sufficiently covered against any undertakings of the Austro-Saxons from Dresden.

"Breslau is protected from the enemy's division at Josephstadt by the 11th Division at Schweidnitz, which will be relieved by the V Army Corps by the 24th day.

"The following table shows how important it is to make the most of the time from the 25th to the 45th day. On the last-named day, after we have weakened ourselves by occupying Saxony and observing Leitmeritz and Josephstadt, we shall lose our superiority.

"If the army is mobilized we must not mind the reproach of aggression, but must march into Saxony on the 24th day. We lose nothing if war is declared on the first day of mobilization, and this will be necessary in order to gain freedom of action in Holstein and on the Main.

(Here follow tables.)

"As we shall have the I Army Corps on the 27th day in the county of Glatz, two or three marches from the enemy's communications, the enemy's forces from Moravia will probably stay to cover them between Hohenstadt and Wildenschwerdt.

"On the 33rd day we can collect at Nachod, in three marches, 114,000 men from Landeshut and Glatz. If the Austrians collect to meet them anything like an equal force at Josephstadt, they will have only 65,000 men to defend Saxony, Northern Bohemia, and Prague; on the same 33rd day the VIII Corps will occupy Saxony, and the I Army, 127,000 men, stand on the line Böhmisch Leipa–Reichenberg."

No. 46. (*Translation.*)

April 28th.

"Austrian troops—

Now near Theresienstadt	30,000
Now near Josephstadt	30,000
By 20th day the corps from Austria ...	40,000
By 30th day the corps from Hungary ...	46,000
At Oswiecim...	18,000
Total	164,000

"On the 25th day our deployment will be complete, and the Austrians will have:—

"At Dresden 30,000 + 24,000 = 54,000, opposed by our VIII, IV, VII, and Guard = 125,000.

"At Trautenau 30,000, opposed by our V, II, and 11th Division = 80,000.

"At Oswiecim 18,000, opposed by our 12th Division, 12,000.

"At Jung-Bunzlau, 60,000.

"If the Austrians intend to defend Saxony they must send all their reinforcements, not to Jung-Bunzlau, but straight on from Prague to Dresden. That would give them at Dresden 54,000 + 60,000 = 114,000, against which we should have, by bringing up III from Bautzen (less 16th Division), 144,000; this case is hardly probable, for it would leave in Bohemia only 30,000 men, against our V, II, I, and 11th Division = 114,000.

"This Silesian Army would threaten the Austrian communications with Austria and Hungary; in all probability, therefore, the Austrians will send their reinforcements arriving up to the 25th day, to Josephstadt, so as to get 30,000 + 60,000 = 90,000, against our 114,000, and the Austro-Saxon Army at Dresden, 54,000, will have been compelled by the position of our III to retire to Böhmisch Leipa.

"Our right wing, which does not reach the Saxon frontier until the 25th day, is disproportionately strong, and we ought to make our left wing stronger if the railways would permit of it without too much loss of time. But even as it is, the second army must immediately take the offensive and concentrate about Nachod by the 30th day.

"By that time the last 26,000 men from Hungary will have reached either Jung-Bunzlau or Josephstadt.

"Quite possible they may be sent to Jung-Bunzlau, as the Austrians will not like to abandon Prague and all Bohemia without striking a blow. In that case they would have on the Iser 54,000 + 26,000 = 80,000, against our first army, 100,000; and or the Upper Elbe 90,000, against our 114,000. At both points we should seek a battle. If the reinforcements go to Josephstadt the Dresden forces would have to retire, and at Josephstadt there would be 116,000 Austrians against 114,000 Prussians.

"In this case, too, though our forces would be equal, we must bring on the decision, because each succeeding day brings the enemy reinforcements either from Dresden or from Slavonia, Croatia, &c., before our first army can come up. The Austrians cannot evade a battle against our second army.

"Seems right to push on the first army along the southern slope of the Giant Mountains in order, if the enemy is able to assemble all his forces on the Upper Elbe, to have all our forces on the spot in time, that is by the 42nd day.

"Austria 240,000, less Galician Corps, 18,000 = 220,000.

"Prussia 285,000, less 16th and 12th Division, 27,000 = 258,000."

No. 47. (*Précis.*)

April 29th.

Preliminary figures as in 46.

If the Austrians send their first reinforcements to their left wing on the Iser, their right wing at Josephstadt will be so inferior to our Silesian Army as to draw upon itself a crushing defeat, and expose all their communications. If they send all their reinforcements to Josephstadt they will be equal to our Silesian Army, which will have to remain on the defensive, but their army on the Iser will be exposed to twice its own numbers, and will have to retreat, though it can evade a battle, which the force at Josephstadt cannot do if our Silesian Army attacks it.

The most probable case being that the Austrian reinforcements will go to Josephstadt, it is desirable to strengthen our left wing and to have it ready as soon as possible. Of this, however, at the start, the railway communications will not admit.

If we find at the beginning that the Austrians have not entered Saxony, and have not their principal force beyond the Iser, we must try to reinforce the Silesian Army by at least part of the III Corps from Görlitz.

If the Austrians bring up all they possibly can, they will, on the 31st day, have 116,000 men near Josephstadt. We should have against them III, V, II, I, and 11th Division, 145,000, or at least 130,000 men.

If, then, the Austrians have entered Saxony or stand beyond the Iser with the Saxons, our Silesian Army must take the offensive at once.

If the Austrians have only an army of observation on the Iser and their main force at Josephstadt, we must send III to the Silesian Army, which must still take the offensive.

If the Austrians assemble all their forces at once on the Upper Elbe we may, perhaps, be obliged to give up this decisive operation.

If the Silesian Army, having an equal force in front of it, is prevented from debouching from the mountains, our first army must disengage it, which it cannot do before the 42nd day, by which time the Austrians will be 200,000 strong. Even then, however, allowing for necessary detachments our armies will have 250,000 men.

The most probable situation on the 30th day is:—

Münchengrätz.

Austrians	100,000
Half of VIII, IV, VII, and Guard ...	114,000

Josephstadt.

Austrians	100,000
Half of III, V, II, I, and half of VI ...	130,000

Upper Silesia.

Austrians	18,000
Prussians, 12th Division	12,000

The decisive battle must come almost at once, and beyond that nothing can be foreseen.

No. 48. (*Précis.*)

End of April.

I.

Suppose we find during the mobilization that the Austrians have occupied Dresden, or have strong forces on the left bank of the Elbe, calculation shows that there will be a decisive battle at Dresden on the 31st day, in which there will be 93,000 Prussians, made up of VIII, VII, and IV.

Question: Where will I and II be most useful? If we put them in Lusatia we shall there have Guard, III, II, and I = 125,000, who will have no enemy in front of them. If we put them in Silesia we shall have V, half of VI, II, and I = 114,000, and if the Austrians oppose this Silesian Army with 100,000 they cannot have more than 80,000 against VIII, VII, and IV. The Austro-Saxon Army on the left bank could only retire by that bank because Guard and III would be the next day with 65,000 men at Schluckenau.

II.

If the Austrians assemble their forces on the right bank they will either—

(*a*) Advance to Dresden.

In that case decisive battle at Dresden on the 29th day, for which we shall have VII, IV, and Guard = 96,000, and perhaps a division of III = 15,000 together 111,000, but we should never be able to bring up I and II from Görlitz.

No doubt I, II, and half of III could be brought up from Görlitz by the 31st day as far as Schluckenau, and as they would be 60,000 to 70,000 strong would greatly endanger the Austrian Army at Dresden if it remained there.

(*b*) The Austrians with the Saxons might take a position in Northern Bohemia, but in that case our force assembling at Gorlitz would be so dangerous to them as to make this course improbable.

No. 49. (*Précis.*)

May 2nd.

If Austria has already finished her mobilization and is now ready to begin the transport, she can have by May 25th altogether 162,000 men in Saxony, Northern Bohemia, and at Josephstadt, and this number can be increased by 63,000 up to June 5th, bringing the total up to 225,000.

If we delay our mobilization until May 10th we shall have this total against us at the very beginning. In that case we should have to abandon the more advantageous offensive from Silesia, because we could not get together there anything like a force equal to the Austrian total, and even a concentration in Lusatia, which is much easier, would have in the first instance to be arranged for the defensive.

The Austrians might start from Dresden on May 25th with 100,000 to 120,000 men in the direction of Berlin, which they would reach in point of time on June 5th.

If we order mobilization not later than May 10th, then the Guard, II, parts of III, and a reserve of Landwehr would form at Berlin an army of about 80,000 men, while the enemy would have to leave a large detachment in front of Torgau, where by May 30th IV and VII would be almost complete.

It would be much safer for the Austrians to advance in the direction of Breslau, as their left flank would then be protected by the Saxons and by the distance; they could begin this advance on May 19th with 50,000 men.

The Prussian forces in Silesia would probably have to retire either beyond Breslau or between Liegnitz and Glogau.

III and II would be at Görlitz, but there would be 140,000 Austro-Saxons facing them in Northern Bohemia.

It is, therefore, *absolutely necessary now at once to concentrate V and 11th Division at Schweidnitz and 12th Division at Neisse; in other words, immediately to mobilize V and VI.*

If we then delay the general mobilization until May 10th, we shall then by June 6th, when the enemy will have all his forces between the Elbe and the Neisse, have 160,000 men, of whom 90,000 will be in Silesia.

In Silesia we shall be on the interior lines of operations, and the Austrians will have to employ 90,000 men against Upper Silesia and upon their communications; this will leave them 135,000 in Northern Bohemia and Saxony, against our 160,000 (leaving out VIII), who will, however, be spread along a line 75 miles long.

Worst Case.

Whole Austrian Army between Dresden and Bautzen. It would have to leave 35,000 men watching Löbau, and would reach the Elster with 100,000 men on June 9th, when we should have behind that stream about an equal force made up of IV, VII, and Guard.

Second Case.

Austrians advancing on left bank. This would be impracticable, for we should bring up VIII, VII, and IV, 93,000, against their 100,000, while the Guard, 34,000, would be in front of Dresden, and III and II, 60,000, at Kamnitz.

Last Case.

The Austrians merely leave in Saxony 54,000, and operate against Silesia with 136,000; we should oppose them on June 9th with V and 11th Division at Schweidnitz–Landeshut, and bring up I from Breslau and II and III from Görlitz *viâ* Hirschberg to Landeshut, making our total here 143,000.

No. 50. (*Précis.*)

To Roon.

April 23rd.

Approves of diminishing the number of fortresses, especially in the interior, but would not demolish them if the inner walls are in good condition except in cases like Saarlouis, which might be exposed to a siege immediately. Would keep Schweidnitz as it is, because, though it could not stand a siege, it could delay the Austrians a few days.

No. 51.

To Stosch. (*Précis.*)

April 24th.

In case of war with Austria we can use five lines, and the Austrians have only one; we can assemble our forces in three weeks and the Austrians need six. Accordingly, at the beginning we shall have a very considerable superiority which, however, will constantly diminish. We must make use of it as quickly as we can, as every day's delay may mean an incalculable loss.

For these reasons almost all the army corps have revised their mobilization tales, and shortened the period which they require to be ready to march—

(*a*) By shortening the period allowed for equipment and arranging to move before the very last reserves have come in.

(*b*) Bringing up the necessary horses by railway.

It is specially important to have IV ready as soon as possible, because upon that depends the advance of other corps, which will be ready sooner.

Please to suggest the measures by which your corps can be ready to move sooner than by existing arrangements.

* * * * *

The II and Guard Corps have so shortened their mobilization that the Guard will now be ready to move on the 20th day instead of on the 42nd. It is very desirable that you should have one infantry division, one light cavalry regiment, and one artillery division, with columns and trains ready for transport as soon as possible.

No. 52. (*Précis.*)

To Room.

May 1st.

Suggests the formation of a railway commission for each army corps; this he calls a line commission, and all the line commissions would work under an executive commission. The line commissions should be under the commanders of armies, the executive commission would be under the Commander-in-Chief of the whole army. The commander of each independent army ought to have a line commission, composed of one officer and one railway official.

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